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CHANGING THE BALANCE:
RHODE ISLAND'S AMENDED TERMINATION
OF PARENTAL RIGHTS STATUTE
I. INTRODUCTION
Rhode Island's child welfare system is governed by several statutes
that address the care of abused and neglected children.' The statutes
conform with federal funding requirements, which mandate the pursuit
of permanent homes for every child.2 Section 15-7-7 of the Rhode
Island General Laws 3 governs the involuntary termination of parental
rights.4 This statute, and the concept of involuntary termination of
1. See. e.g, RI. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-34 (1994) (placement of dependent and
neglected children); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7 (Supp. 1994) (termination of parental rights);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-12.3 (Supp. 1994) (guardianship subsidies). In Rhode Island, the
Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) implements child welfare policy.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-72-1 (1993).
2. The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272,
94 Stat. 500 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (AACWA) dictates
federal policy.
3. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7 (Supp. 1994). The termination of parental rights
statute appears in Chapter 7, entitled "Adoption of Children." See infra part IV for a
detailed discussion of the statute.
4. Termination of parental rights refers to the formal removal of the parent's
capacity to consent to the adoption of the child. This technical description does not
convey the full impact of the act: termination of parental rights ends the relationship
between parent and child. See infra text accompanying notes 206-09. Once the court
terminates parental rights, the state retains guardianship over the child until adoption
occurs. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-12 (Supp. 1994). Parents may voluntarily terminate their
parental rights by waiving consent to the future adoption of the child. R.I. GEN. LAWS
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parental rights, is integral to the implementation of the permanency
goal.' In July, 1994, the Rhode Island General Assembly modified
section 15-7-76 as part of a package of child welfare amendments.
These amendments represent one stage in an overall reform of Rhode
Island's child welfare agency The modifications accelerate the
§ 15-7-6 (1988). A separate statute addresses termination of the rights of putative fathers.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-26 (1988). Section 15-7-7 addresses the involuntary termination
of parental rights. R.I. GEN. LAwS § 15-7-7 (Supp. 1994). This state-initiated proceeding
terminates the residual rights of parents who previously lost custody in an adjudication of
neglect or abuse. Id. Residual rights include the right to consent to adoption and the right
to visitation. MARY A. MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THE
HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 149-50 (1994).
5. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the role of the
termination of parental rights statute in securing permanent homes for children.
6. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7 (Supp. 1994).
7. Telephone Interview with Representative Nancy Benoit, Chair of the Rhode
Island House DCYF Oversight Committee (Jan. 8, 1995). The General Assembly also
modified R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 40-11-12,40-12.1 to -12.3 (Supp. 1994). The effect of these
modifications is two-fold: (1) Changes to § 40-11-12.1 shorten the length of time a child
is in DCYF's care before Family Court holds a dispositional hearing; (2) Changes to
§§ 40-11-12 and 40-11-12.3 create a subsidized guardianship alternative to termination of
parental rights and adoption. See infra notes 51 and 188 for a discussion of dispositional
hearings. See infra notes 308-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of guardianship.
In addition, the General Assembly authorized the addition of one judge to Family Court
to reduce the backlog of child welfare cases. The court was delayed in assigning that
judge to the DCYF calendar full time pending funding of an additional public defender
position to represent parents. Gina Macris, Reuniting Families Leaves Abused Children
in Limbo; New Laws Prod Debate Among Social Workers About Trying to Fix Broken
Families, PROV. J.-BULL., Feb. 5, 1995, at Al, A17.
8. DCYF is responsible for the juvenile correction system, children's mental
health, and the more traditional child welfare services to abused and neglected children.
See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-72-16 to -18 (1993) for a discussion of DCYF's responsibilities.
DCYF and the Department of Mental Health, Rehabilitation and Hospitals share the
services for developmentally disabled children. Id. § 42-72-18. The child welfare agency
was named Child Welfare Services, and the Department for Children and Their Families,
prior to its current appellation. See id. § 42-72-16(A) (transferring power over the
administration of child welfare services to DCYF). For purposes of this Note, the earlier-
named versions will be referred to as either "the state" or "DCYF."
After a series of highly publicized deaths and injuries to children, the legislature
mounted an effort to reform the functioning of DCYF to more adequately protect Rhode
Island's children. The General Assembly DCYF Oversight Committee, co-chaired by
Representative Benoit, provides ongoing legislative review. See, e.g., Laureen D'Ambra
& Noreen Shawcross, Formalized Office of Child Advocate Effectively Monitors Children
in State Care, BROwN U. CHILD AND ADOLESCENT BEHAVIOR LETTER, March, 1993, at
2, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File; Laura M. Kirk, No Jailfor Mom
in Child's Murder, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 11, 1993, at A5; Gina Macris, Joann Rossi-
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termination process; the goal is to increase adoptions for children
removed from their parents.9
In developing a system for responding to the needs of children who
cannot remain at home with their parents, each state has adopted the
goals of the permanency planning movement." A focused analysis of
the history and application of one state's efforts to implement
permanency planning goals may assist analysis of child welfare systems
in other states. Thus, this Note provides a detailed description of Rhode
Island's child welfare system and the statute governing termination of
parental rights.
Specifically, this Note examines the implications of amended section
15-7-7 in the context of child welfare's mission." Part II briefly
outlines the historical development of the current child welfare policy,
the federal mandates to the states, and the role of the termination of
parental rights in child welfare policy. Part III examines decisions of the
United States Supreme Court and Rhode Island Supreme Court, and their
respective analyses of the competing interests of the child, the parent,
and the state. Part IV provides a detailed examination of the history of
the termination of parental rights statute in Rhode Island, and the effects
of the recent amendments. Part V considers the impact of the changes
on policy and service delivery within the child welfare system in Rhode
Island.
Casiano Admitted Hitting Son, Investigator Testifies, PROV. J.-BuLL., June 7, 1994, at 4D.
The legislative package discussed in this Note is one outcome of the reform effort, and
was drafted by a commission consisting of members of the Oversight Committee; the
Chief Justice of Rhode Island's Family Court, the Hon. Jeremiah S. Jeremiah, Jr.; Family
Court Associate Judge Raymond Shawcross; the Child Advocate, Laureen D'Ambra; and
the Director of DCYF, Linda D'Amario Rossi. Telephone Interview with Kevin Aucoin,
Chief Legal Counsel, DCYF (Jan. 5, 1994).
9. Telephone Interview with Kevin Aucoin, supra note 8. DCYF reports a
significant increase in the number of termination petitions filed since the passage of the
amendments. Macris, supra note 7, at A17.
10. See infra part II.B for a discussion of permanency planning.
11. "Child welfare" refers to the systemic response to children living in, or at risk
for, out-of-home placement. The children served by the child welfare system may have
special needs or handicapping conditions of their own. However, a concern about the
parent's ability to care for the child triggers the attention of the child welfare system.
CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, CHILDREN WITHOUT HOMES: AN EXAMINATION OF PUBLIC
RESPONSIBILITY TO CHILDREN IN OUT-OF-HOME CARE 3 n.5 (1978) [hereinafter CHILDREN
WITHOUT HOMEs]. See infra part II.B. for a discussion of the federal funding mandates
for child welfare services.
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II. THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM
The federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980
guides current child welfare policy in the United States. 2 This Part
describes past solutions to the problems posed by children in need of
assistance.' 3  A discussion of the federal legislative response to the
unique problems of children follows.' 4 Finally, this Part discusses
permanency planning and the role of the termination of parental rights
statute in achieving permanent homes for children. 5
A. A Brief History of Child Welfare
The federal government did not turn its attention to the plight of
orphaned, abandoned, or otherwise needy children until the twentieth
century.' 6  Early local solutions to the problem of destitute or aban-
doned children included indenture or apprenticeships, almshouses, and
institutions. 7 The use of indenture and institutional care declined
throughout the nineteenth century.' 8 Simultaneously, private societies,
12. Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
13. See infra notes 16-30 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 31-59 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 60-82 and accompanying text.
16. See infra text accompanying note 29.
17. See Kermit T. Wiltse, Current Issues and New Directions in Foster Care, in
CHILD WELFARE STRATEGY IN THE COMING YEARS 51, 54 (Children's Bureau, U.S. Dep't
of Health, Educ. & Wel. ed., 1978); MASON, supra note 4, at 108-11. During the colonial
period, children played an essential role in the labor force, whether as indentured servants,
apprentices, or, in the case of black children, slaves. MASON, supra note 4, at 1-4. Courts
reviewed indenture contracts, dealt with cases of runaway servants, and intervened in cases
of neglect that threatened the economic viability of a child. Id. at 3, 4. In 1874, the first
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children was founded in New York, patterned
upon the existing animal-protection societies. Id. at 101. Throughout the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, the states developed legislation proscribing the misuse of
children and granting authority for the removal of children. Id. The authorities generally
applied the laws to parents who were neglectfil as a result of incompetence or unfitness.
Id. at 104. Physical abuse of children was perceived as a form of parental discipline and,
thus was tolerated. Id. at 102-03.
18. ALFRED KADUSHIN & JuDiTH A. MARTIN, CHILD WELFARE SERVICES 346-47
(4th ed. 1988).
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alarmed by the increase in the number of destitute and "vagrant 19
children in the cities, started the "placing-out" movement. 0 These
societies sent large numbers2 of urban poor children, many of whom
were neither vagrant nor orphaned, to rural Western communities. 2
When the children arrived, townspeople placed them with families in
exchange for the child's labor.23 The private societies retained custody
of the children and often sought to prevent reunification with their
parents, whose only fault may have been that they lived in poverty.24
The placing-out approach to finding homes for children had
numerous shortcomings. No systematic screening of receiving families
took place, and once placement occurred, no one provided adequate
supervision." The states that received these children responded by
passing legislation regulating the practice,2 6 while public agencies in
other states began developing institutional care and foster homes as
alternatives to placing-out.27
These early state efforts were generally founded upon "child-rescue"
principles of removing children from harmful environments, incidentally
severing the relationship with the biological parent.28  The initial
19. In the mid-nineteenth century, the Chief of Police of New York City reported
there were approximately 10,000 vagrant children "who infest our public thoroughfares,
hotels, docks, etc., children who are growing up in ignorance and profligacy, only destined
to a life of misery, shame, and crime and ultimately to a felon's doom." Id. at 347.
20. Karoline S. Homer, Program Abuse in Foster Care: A Search for Solutions,
I VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 177, 182 (1993). See also KADUSHIN & MARTIN, supra note
18, at 347-50 (discussing the "placing out" movement and its founder, Charles Loring
Brace).
21. By 1892, the Children's Aid Society had placed 84,318 children. LAWRENCE
M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 494 (2d ed. 1985).
22. KADUSHIN & MARTIN, supra note 18, at 347-48.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Homer, supra note 20, at 182.
26. KADUSHIN & MARTIN, supra note 18, at 348. MASON, supra note 4, at 80.
States were concerned that large numbers of juvenile delinquents were being "dumped"
within their borders. Id.
27. KADUSHIN & MARTIN, supra note 18, at 349-50. These were the first modem
foster homes. Some states paid foster parents board money, reflecting a shift away from
placing children for their labor value, to securing homes to meet their emotional needs.
Id. at 350.
28. "While well-intentioned, [the child-rescue] philosophy often doomed children
to years of drift in foster care, with little or no hope of being placed in a permanent
1996]
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involvement of the federal government29 compounded the tendency for
states to remove children: Federal programs provided states with funds
for foster-care services, without requiring prevention or reunification
efforts.3" Permanency planning attempts to address this reliance on out-
of-home placement as a solution to environmental deficits.
B. The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980:
A New Model for Child Welfare Services
The passage of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of
1980 (AACWA) 31 made permanency planning32 the guiding principle
of the child welfare system. The permanency planning concept
developed in response to the inadequacies of earlier solutions to the
problems of poor, orphaned, or abandoned children. 33  The core
principle of permanency planning is the recognition that children need to
form psychological ties with primary caretakers, and that, absent clear
and serious harm to children, 4 those caretakers should be the child's
home." Alice C. Shotton, Making Reasonable Efforts in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases:
Ten Years Later, 26 CAL. W. L. REv. 223, 255 (1990). Parents had no procedural
safeguards beyond the writ of habeas corpus. Stephen R. Shealy, Note, Does Connecticut
Provide Adequate Due Process Protection to Parents Facing a Termination of Their
Parental Rights?, 8 CONN. PROB. L.J. 69, 72 (1993).
29. In 1935, Congress enacted Aid to Dependent Children, which provided states
with funds for "needy dependent children." Homer, supra note 20, at 183. In 1961,
Congress changed the focus from "aid to children to aid to families with dependent
children," id., creating the present day AFDC program.
30. Id. at 183-84.
31. Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
32. Permanency planning is "the systemic process of carrying out, within a brief,
time-limited period, a set of goal-directed activities designed to help children live in
families that offer continuity of relationships with nurturing parents or caretakers and the
opportunity to establish lifetime relationships." Homer, supra note 20, at 185 (citations
omitted).
33. See supra part II.A for a discussion of earlier efforts to address children's
needs.
34. The emphasis of the child welfare system has shifted from orphaned or
abandoned children to those who have been abused or neglected within their biological
families. See Wiltse, supra note 17, at 66 (stating that statutory removal criteria based on
"specific harm to the child," rather than "parental conduct," are more relevant to the
child's needs and more informative to the parent about remedial actions). See generally
KADUSHIN & MARTIN, supra note 18, at 346-51 (discussing the history of child welfare
services). This shift in emphasis to abuse and neglect reflects changes in family structures
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parents. 5 Once a disruption occurs in a child's placement with her
family, the child welfare system should quickly reunify the child with her
family or find a permanent placement for her with another family
through adoption.36  Out-of-home placement37 is meant to be only a
temporary solution.3
A growing awareness of children's psychological needs motivated
the permanency planning concept.39 Simultaneously, studies of out-of-
home care revealed numerous detrimental conditions, primarily the
which resulted from increased single-parenting and poverty. MASON, supra note 4, at 121.
35. "Deference to parental child rearing... serves society's interests in fostering
social pluralism and diversity, and supports our basic social institutions and values .... "
Marsha Garrison, Child Welfare Decisionmaking: In Search of the Least Drastic Alterna-
tive, 75 GEO. L.J. 1745, 1770-71 (1987). This deference to parents is codified in the
AACWA: One of the purposes of child welfare services under the AACWA is to
"prevent[] the unnecessary separation of children from their families by identifying family
problems, assisting families in resolving their problems, and preventing breakup of the
family where the prevention of child removal is desirable and possible." 42 U.S.C.
§ 625(a)(1)(C) (1994). Cf R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-72-2(l) (1993) ("[P]arents have the
primary responsibility for meeting the needs of their children and the state has an
obligation to help them discharge this responsibility or to assume this responsibility when
parents are unable to do so....").
36. 42 U.S.C. § 625(a)(1XD)-(E) (additional purposes of child welfare services
are to "restor[e] to their families children who have been removed" and to "plac[e]
children in suitable adoptive homes, in cases where restoration to the biological family is
not possible or appropriate"). See also Homer, supra note 20, at 187-93 (discussing the
AACWA); CHILDREN WITHOUT HOMES, supra note 11, at 15; KADUSHIN & MARTIN,
supra note 18, at 351.
37. Out-of-home placement takes many forms: foster, or substitute-family care;
residential treatment centers; group homes; emergency shelters; institutions; and psychiatric
hospitals. CHILDREN WITHOUT HOMES, supra note 11, at 2.
38. Foster care is "[a] child welfare service which provides substitute family care
for a planned period for a child when his own family cannot care for him .... " Smith
v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 823 (1977)
(alteration in original) (quoting the CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, STANDARDS
FOR FOSTER FAMILY CARE SERVICE 5 (1959)). See KADUSHIN & MARTIN, supra note 18,
at 344 (discussing substitute care as the "third line of defense in child welfare"); Homer,
supra note 20, at 185-86 (noting a "consensus that foster care is damaging because it
separates a child from her family ... and lead[s] to multiple placements"); Jamie D.
Manasco, Student Article, Parent-Child Relationships: The Impetus Behind the Gregory
K. Decision, 17 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 243, 245 (1993) ("[T]he foster care system is not
intended to be a long-term arrangement.").
39. See infra text accompanying notes 60-70 for a discussion of children's
psychological needs for permanency.
19961
Washington University Open Scholarship
160 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 50:153
absence of stable relationships between children and identified caretak-
ers.4  These studies contributed to a national reform effort.4'
Permanency planning attempts to ensure that the state intervenes with
families only when children are at risk of immediate harm, while
employing the least intrusive means necessary to improve the
situation.42
The AACWA codified the principles of permanency planning.43
40. Despite federal and state efforts, the concerns regarding children in out-of-
home care have proven to be intractable. Demographics regarding today's foster children
reflect the same concerns which sparked the reform efforts. One source estimates that
currently 400,000 children are in foster care, with an anticipated one million by the year
2000. Manasco, supra note 38, at 248. Nearly 20% of the children in foster care remain
there for five years or more; 50% remain for more than two years. Id. Out-of-home
placements do not result in permanence for the majority of placed children: 55%
experience two or more placements; eight percent experience six or more placements.
Homer, supra note 20, at 195. Congress has found that "tens of thousands" of children
are in foster care; they will wait a median of two and three-quarters years for adoption.
H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). Children are not being placed near their homes,
creating an additional state-imposed barrier to reunification. Homer, supra note 20, at 195.
As the length of time a child spends in foster care increases, the tie between the natural
parent and child diminishes. KADUSHIN & MARTIN, supra note 18, at 351. In an alternate
analysis, Garrison reviews the statistics regarding the duration of out-of-home placement
and suggests that the risk of multiple placements does not increase significantly with
duration. Garrison, supra note 35, at 1823. For a comprehensive overview of the use of
foster care in the 1970s, immediately prior to passage of the AACWA, see generally,
CHILDREN WITHOUT HOMES, supra note 11, at 3-9 (reporting the results of in-depth
studies of seven states' child welfare systems). See also Deborah Sharp, In Florida, a
Challenge to Foster Care, USA TODAY, Feb. 14, 1995, at 3A (discussing a suit filed in
a Florida federal court to prevent the placement of more children in foster care).
41. See Homer, supra note 20, at 186-87.
42. Id. at 184-85.
43. Under the AACWA, Congress directed states to provide "child welfare
services" for the following purposes:
(A) protecting and promoting the welfare of all children, including handicapped,
homeless, dependent, or neglected children;
(3) preventing or remedying, or assisting in the solution of problems which may
result in, the neglect, abuse, exploitation, or delinquency of children;
(C) preventing the unnecessary separation of children from their families by
identifying family problems, assisting families in resolving their problems, and
preventing breakup of the family where the prevention of child removal is desirable
and possible;
(D) restoring to their families children who have been removed, by the provision of
services to the child and the families;
(E) placing children in suitable adoptive homes, in cases where restoration to the
biological family is not possible or appropriate; and
(F) assuring adequate care of children away from their homes, in cases where the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol50/iss1/7
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The Act amended Title IV of the Social Security Act to create funding
incentives for states to develop child welfare services in keeping with the
principles of permanency planning.!4 Modified Title IV-B requires
states to inventory all children placed in out-of-home care,45 conduct
periodic case reviews,46 implement a tracking system,47 and create a
service system that promotes reunification or adoption.48 The Act also
amended Title IV-E to provide funding for foster-care services.49 The
legislation mandated several protections to ensure that placements were
both necessary and time-limited: 50 it required states to establish case-
plan review systems," make "reasonable efforts" 52 to prevent the
child cannot be returned home or cannot be placed for adoption.
42 U.S.C. § 625(a)(1).
44. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-628, 670-679(a) (1994). The AACWA is codified in
two sections, Title IV-B and Title IV-E of the Social Security Act. Homer, supra note 20,
at 187-93 (discussing the structure of the AACWA and the amendments Congress made
to Titles IV-B and IV-E). Congress intended Title V-B to provide funding to those states
that were "establishing, extending, and strengthening child welfare services." 42 U.S.C.
§ 620(a). Under Title V-E, Congress intended to reimburse those states that provided
"foster care and transitional independent living programs." 42 U.S.C. § 670.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 627(a)(1). In addition, the state must determine whether the
current foster placement is necessary and whether the child should be reunited with his
parents or placed for adoption. Id.
46. 42 U.S.C § 627(a)(2)(B).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 627(a)(2XA). This system should track the "status, demographic
characteristics, location, and goals" for every child placed in a foster home. Id.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 627(a)(2XC). See Homer, supra note 20, at 188-90 (discussing
Title TV-B provisions).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 670.
50. Homer, supra note 20, at 190-93 (outlining Title IV-E protections against
unwarranted or overlengthy removals).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5). The case plan review is to ensure that (A) the child is
placed "in close proximity to the parents' home"; (B) a court reviews the status of the
child at least every six months "to determine the continuing necessity for and appropriate-
ness of the placement,... and the extent of progress.., toward alleviating... the causes
necessitating placement"; (C) and a dispositional hearing is held in family or juvenile court
within eighteen months of the child's placement. Id. § 675(5)(A)-(C).
Rhode Island has implemented the case-plan review requirement as follows: Upon a
finding of abuse, neglect, or dependency, Family Court directs DCYF to develop a case
plan within thirty days. R.I. R. Juv. P. 17(c) (1994). DCYF submits the plan to the court
for approval or modification. Id. The plan is then reviewed in court every six months.
Id. § 17(d). Section 40-11-12.1 of the General Laws of Rhode Island governs dispositional
hearings. The Rhode Island legislature amended this statute to require a dispositional
hearing within twelve months of placement with DCYF, rather than the initial adjudication.
1996]
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placement of a child, and facilitate a child's return home after
removal. 3
Congress intended to promote preventive services to ameliorate
conditions likely to result in the removal of a child and the destruction
of the family unit.54 However, in funding the AACWA, Congress
provided open-ended funding for foster-care services through Title IV-
E,55 while underfunding preventive services under Title IV-B.56 This
predictably resulted in states continuing to reap the financial benefits of
maintaining children in foster care, rather than preventing the initial
family disintegration. 7 In the several cases where states have failed to
properly implement the AACWA," the ills that Congress sought to
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-12.1(1) (Supp. 1994). This amendment was necessary to bring
DCYF into compliance with the AACWA eighteen-month requirement. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 675(5)(A)-(C).
52. A state's eligibility for funding under the AACWA is dependent upon a
showing that it made "reasonable efforts" to prevent placement; however, neither the
AACWA nor the federal regulations define the standard. Homer, supra note 20, at 197.
This has resulted in uncertainty in implementation. See David J. Herring, Inclusion of the
Reasonable Efforts Requirement in Termination of Parental Rights Statutes: Punishing
the Child for the Failures of the State Child Welfare System, 54 U. PIT. L. REV. 139, 142
(1992) (stating that a requirement of reasonable efforts by the state agency prior to the
termination of parental rights is not an incentive to provide the necessary services, but
rather is an unnecessary condition precedent delaying appropriate terminations). But see
Patrick R. Tamilia, A Response to Elimination of the Reasonable Efforts Required Prior
to Termination of Parental Rights Status, 54 U. PITr. L. REv. 211, 211-12, 227-28 (1992)
(arguing that the ineffectiveness of child welfare reforms is due to resolvable systemic
problems, not the "reasonable efforts" standard).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) ("[R]easonable efforts will be made.., prior to the
placement of a child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the
child from his home, and... to make it possible for the child to return to his home.").
54. 42 U.S.C. § 625(a)(1)(C). "Congress wanted to ensure that each individual
case would receive close scrutiny before the child was removed, and that the individual
rights of the children and family would be protected." Homer, supra note 20, at 193.
"Congress sought to... eliminat[e] economic incentives to place children in foster homes
and increas[e] incentives for preventive services." Id. at 196.
55. The AACWA also mandated subsidized adoption for "special-needs" children,
for whom adoption without subsidies is difficult to attain. 42 U.S.C. § 673(c)(2)(A)-(B).
56. Homer, supra note 20, at 196.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 194-202. In addition to the funding inequities, see supra text
accompanying notes 55-57, and the undefined "reasonable efforts" standard, see supra note
52, the AACWA requirements for states are too burdensome, given present resources: state
agency workers have far too many cases; there are insufficient numbers of foster families;
and juvenile courts are overloaded and cannot meet the review requirements. Id. at 197-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol50/iss1/7
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address continue unabated. 9
C. Achieving Permanence
In order to understand the place of involuntary termination of
parental rights in the permanency planning concept, one must consider
the particular needs children have for continued care. First, this section
briefly describes children's psychological processes. Next, this section
describes how the AACWA attempts to ensure the continuity of a child's
relationships with a permanent caretaker. Finally, it describes the role
played by the termination of parental rights in achieving permanence.
Children progress through a number of developmental stages, each
with its own set of tasks.' A child must successfully negotiate the
tasks of each early stage to succeed in subsequent stages.61 As a result
of the physical helplessness of infancy and early childhood, children are
dependent upon adult caretakers to provide a safe environment.62
Through their daily interaction, the child develops an attachment to the
primary caretaker; primary attachment to the caretaker serves as a vehicle
for mastery of developmental tasks. 63 Disruptions from the external
200. Federal monitoring of states has been lax, and reimbursement for eligible expenses
has been slow. Id.
59. Id. at 194 ('"[Flor many children-particularly the most vulnerable and
troubled children and their families-we have failed."') (quoting Rep. George Miller).
60. Many theorists have created models of childhood development premised upon
stages. See, e.g., ERIK H. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 247-74 (2d ed. 1963)
(outlining eight stages of personality development); SIGMUND FREUD, THE EGO AND THE
ID (Joan Riviere, trans., James Strachey, ed. 1962) (discussing the formation of the
personality structure); 2 LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL
DEVELOPMENT, in ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT, 1-205 (1984) (outlining the
cognitive developmental approach to socialization and moralization); 1 JANE LOEVINGER
& RUTH WESSLER, MEASURING EGO DEVELOPMENT 1-8 (1970) (defining stages of ego
development); JEAN PIAGET, THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY IN THE CHILD 3-96
(Margaret Cook trans., 1954) (outlining the stages of cognitive development). For an
excellent analysis and comparison of the many theories of ego development, see John
Snarey et al., Ego Development and Education: A Structural Perspective, in CHILD
PSYCHOLOGY AND CHILDHOOD EDUCATION: A COGNITIVE-DEVELOPMENTAL VIEW 329
(Lawrence Kohlberg ed., 1987).
61. See, e.g., Snarey, supra note 60, at 370 (discussing Erikson's ego
development theory).
62. See generally JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD 9-17 (1979) (describing children's psychological processes).
63. Id. at 17-18. The caretaker is referred to as the "psychological parent." Id.
While for adults, attachment to a child is strengthened by biological relation, children form
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environment, particularly those that interfere with the child's relationship
with the "psychological parent," affect the child's psychological
development. 4 Although the impact varies with the particular stage of
development, 65 repeated disruptions can cumulatively damage a child's
capacity to form attachments. 6  Children do not sense time by
objective, external events; rather, they experience the passage of time in
direct relation to their ability to manage frustration and anxiety.6 7 A
separation which an adult may tolerate could prove damaging to a young
child.68 Thus, separations from psychological parents should be as short
as possible. 9 If the state cannot reunify the child with a parent, it
should provide the child with an opportunity to form a relationship with
a new psychological parent with "all deliberate speed. 7°
this primary attachment based on the continuity of care. Id. at 16-17.
64. Id. at 32-34 (discussing the effects of disruptions during infancy, childhood,
and adolescence).
65. See id. at 40-42. This concept is reflected in § 15-7-7's requirement that
determinations of a child's probable reunification with her parent be assessed in light of
"the child's age and the need for a permanent home." See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWiS § 15-7-
7(l)(b)(iii) (Supp. 1994). In addition, the Rhode Island General Assembly amended the
dispositional hearing statute to mandate parental rights termination proceedings for those
children age 10 and younger after they have been in care for 12 months. R.I. GEN. LAWs
§ 40-11-12.1(5)(d) (Supp. 1994). See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-102(1.6) (Supp.
1994) ("[C]hildren undergo a critical bonding and attachment process prior to the time they
reach six years of age .... [A] child who has not bonded with a primary adult during this
critical stage will suffer significant emotional damage which frequently leads to chronic
psychological problems ...."). Id.
66. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 62, at 32-34 (detailing the impact of disruption at the
different stages of development).
67. Id. at 40-49. Children have a difficult time anticipating the future and
managing delays. Id. at 40. Instead, children base their sense of time on their "instinctual
and emotional needs." Id. Only when children begin to incorporate the way their parents
fulfill their needs will they begin to anticipate the future and manage delays. Id.
68. Id. A child's ability to deal with the absence of his parents varies with the
child's age. Id. An infant may endure a few days before feeling overwhelmed, while a
young child may not feel anxiety due to the absence of his parents for a longer period.
Id. at 40-41.
69. Id. at 40-49. Lengthy delays may cause the child to attach to the new
caretaker, who will become the child's psychological parent. Id.
70. Id. at 42. Garrison takes a different position on the speed with which the
state should seek terminations. She proposes that states should not seek terminations until
the child has been in placement for three years. Garrison, supra note 35, at 1825. She
bases her proposal upon her finding that the risk of instability in placement is low during
the early years of placement, the significant possibility that parents can regain custody
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The AACWA requires the state to hold a dispositional hearing
within eighteen months of the child's removal from a family.7 ' The
goal, from the perspective of the child's best interests,72 is to prevent
extended periods of disruption in a child's attachment to her primary
parent.73 The AACWA directs the judge to determine the likelihood of
the child's return home within a reasonable period.74 If the original
conditions which resulted in the child's removal have been ameliorated
sufficiently, the judge will return the child home.75  However, if the
parent has demonstrated unfitness, the court will find another permanent
home for the child.76 In this circumstance, the court will schedule
termination proceedings. 77  Ideally, the parent-child relationship is
quickly terminated, and another family with whom the child has
established a psychological bond may adopt her.78
within this time, and the inability of agencies to provide necessary services in a timely
fashion. Id.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5XC) (1988). The dispositional hearing "shall determine the
future status of the child." Id. See Homer, supra note 20, at 199 (noting that dispositional
hearings are delayed in many states). See supra note 7 for a discussion of Rhode Island's
compliance with this requirement of the AACWA.
72. Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit propose changing the "child's best interests"
standard to the "least detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the child's growth
and development" GOLDSTEIN, supra note 62, at 53. The authors point to the conflict
between the apparent meaning of the "best interests" standard and its application, which
often results in long periods of uncertainty while courts determine the respective rights of
the parties. Id. at 54-64. For a discussion of the difficulty in applying the "best interest
of the child" standard, see Robert H. Mnookin, The Enigma of Children's Interests, in IN
THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN 16, 16-18 (Robert H. Mnookin ed., 1985) (describing the
"best interest of the child" standard as indeterminate due to poor predictive ability and the
value-laden nature of the decision).
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C).
74. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.22(a) (West Supp. 1996). At the
eighteen-month hearing, the judge may return the child to her parents, or order a
"permanency planning" hearing under § 366.26. Id. At the permanency planning hearing,
the court may order an adoption, guardianship, or long-term foster care. Id.
75. See, e.g., id. The court will consider reports from probation officers and any
appointed child advocate. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Reality may be quite different: termination may result in an unintended
disruption. When the state removes a child from home, it is rarely clear whether a parent
will be able to regain custody within the eighteen-month period. In all likelihood,
availability will determine a child's initial placement, rather than the state worker's
estimation of the length of time the child will be in care and the setting that best meets the
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The termination of parental rights statute' is critical for the
permanent placement of each child removed from a biological family.
The statute has three notable features: First, the statute specifies the
grounds for termination and thus serves notice to both the state and the
biological parents.80 Second, the reasonable efforts requirement ought
to serve as a guarantee that the state does not permanently remove
children from parents who have the capacity to provide adequate care.8 '
child's present and future needs. Certainly, it is doubtful that the initial placement will be
with a "pre-adoptive" foster family; that is, a family which has identified itself as seeking
a child for adoption. Thus, if, after the initial placement, a worker decides that adoption
is the likely outcome, the state must move the child to a pre-adoptive home. Once the
child arrives in a pre-adoptive foster home, however, the parties face a second conundrum:
it is not certain that, in the end, the child will be available for adoption. Thus, the
formation of the new "permanent" psychological bond is paradoxically occurring in an
atmosphere of impermanence and uncertainty. See generally GOLDSTEIN, supra note 62,
at 35-37 (discussing the impact of probationary periods before finalizing adoption decrees).
California's approach may minimize the potential disruption of a termination: the relevant
statute mandates that a termination petition will not be granted unless the court finds "by
clear and convincing evidence that it is likely that the minor will be adopted." CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(c)(1) (West Supp. 1996). See also Garrison, supra note
35, at 1826 ("No parent's rights should finally be terminated unless and until a permanent
placement is available.").
79. As stated in the Introduction, this Note concerns itself only with the
procedures for involuntary termination of the rights of parents whose custody the state has
suspended due to abuse or neglect. Many states passed termination statutes during the late
1960s and early 1970s. Rosemary S. Sackett, Terminating Parental Rights of the
Handicapped, 25 FAM. L.Q. 253, 255 (1991). Early versions of Rhode Island's
termination of parental rights statutes provided that a court, in considering an adoption
petition, could terminate a parent's right to consent to an adoption under certain specified
conditions, including mental incompetence and abandonment. See infra part IV.A for a
discussion of the earlier versions of § 15-7-7. By 1980, Rhode Island's emphasis had
shifted from the parent's right to consent to the impending adoption, to a child-welfare
purpose of permanently severing the relationship between a child and an unfit parent,
regardless of the child's potential for adoption. Some states specifically place their
termination statutes in chapters related to child welfare, rather than adoption. See, e.g.,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-112 (West Supp. 1995) (Child Welfare); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 41-3-609 (1995) (Child Abuse and Neglect); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-15.1 (West
Supp. 1995) (Dependent and Neglected Children).
80. See, e.g., Judith D. Wolferts, Recent Development, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 343,
350-51 (stating that the clarification of statutory grounds for termination permits judges
to "move more confidently to terminate parental rights").
81. See Tamilia, supra note 52, at 218 (suggesting that the reasonable efforts
standard is necessary to implement the permanency planning goal of severing parent-child
ties only as a last resort). But see Herring, supra note 52, at 142-43 (arguing that
appropriate application of the reasonable efforts standard occurs during the period
preceding termination hearings). The reasonable efforts requirement also counteracts bias
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Finally, the termination of parental rights is the condition precedent to
adoption of a child whose biological parents are unfit and unwilling to
relinquish their rights. 2
III. THE BALANCING ACT
Permanency planning and the child welfare system as a whole focus
on the best interests of the child. However, the application of permanen-
cy planning principles requires courts to examine the child's interest in
the context of the family relationship. 3 The constitutional principles
of family law require balancing the interests of the child, the parent, and
the state. Part III.A discusses the development of this balancing process
by the United States Supreme Court. Part III.B examines Rhode Island's
application of these emerging constitutional principles.
A. The United States Supreme Court
Although state law traditionally governs matters concerning the
family, throughout this century, the United States Supreme Court has
issued rulings that affect family relationships." The Court has
considered cases raising the constitutional principles governing the
against fit parents living in poverty. For a discussion of the increased exposure of poor
families to the risk of child removal, see MASON, supra note 4, at 153-54. Mason states
that three factors contribute to the greater removal of children from poor families: first,
cultural differences between poor families and the middle class affect judgements of the
adequacy of parenting; second, state agencies scrutinize poor parents who rely on public
assistance programs more closely; third, poverty is associated with problems such as
substance abuse which increase the likelihood of child abuse or neglect. Id. at 154.
82. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-5 (1988) (requiring parental consent for
adoption of minors).
83. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 675(l)(B) (1994) (describing the case plan
requirements, including services to improve the parents' home). For a discussion of the
difficulties in implementing the AACWA's reasonable efforts requirement, see supra note
52. For a discussion of Rhode Island's implementation of the reasonable efforts
requirement, see infra notes 198-204, 251-54, 318-20 and accompanying text.
84. The increased involvement of the Supreme Court in an area traditionally left
to the states is the result of two developments: First, the creation of federal social-reform
programs requires federal courts to address statutory and administrative issues related to
these programs. Second, the development of due process, equal protection, and rights-to-
privacy jurisprudence provides litigants with new tools to challenge state statutes. EVA
R. RUBIN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN FAMILY 12-13 (1986).
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interrelationship of parent, child, and state.85 These cases involve such
issues as the right to decide how to educate one's children; 6 rights to
contraception 7 and abortion;"s and the due process rights of foster
parents, 9 illegitimate fathers,9" and parents whose rights were
terminated.9 In general, the family-rights cases reflect a particular
conception of family9' that subsumes the child's interests into those of
85. One author states that, despite the expansive language the Court uses in
discussing parent or family rights, the holdings are necessarily much narrower. Francis
B. McCarthy, The Confused Constitutional Status and Meaning of Parental Rights, 22 GA.
L. REV. 975, 985 (1988). "[W]hat has developed is a patchwork of decisions that leave
many questions unanswered." Id.
86. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments protect the rights of Amish parents to direct their children's
religious education); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (finding that statute
requiring public school education unreasonably interfered with parents' liberty to direct
their children's education); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (stating that statute
forbidding instruction in foreign languages infringed on parents' rights to control their
children's education).
87. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that statute
forbidding the distribution of contraceptives to single persons violated the Equal Protection
Clause); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that statute forbidding the
use of contraceptive devices by married couples violated a protected right to privacy).
88. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (holding that
spousal notification requirements constitute an undue burden on a woman's right to choose
whether to terminate a pregnancy); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (concluding that
women have a protected right to choose an abortion).
89. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (finding that
the interests of foster families do not outweigh those of a natural parent).
90. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (holding that use of the "best
interests of the child" standard in permitting adoption by a step-father did not violate an
unmarried father's due process and equal protection rights); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972) (holding that statutory scheme which created a presumption that unwed fathers
were "unfit" violated due process).
91. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (holding that due process requires
the state prove statutory grounds for termination of parental rights by clear and convincing
evidence).
92. Rubin states:
The family accepted by the Supreme Court in these early cases is clearly the ideal
Victorian family. The family unit is a small government in its own right.... The
rearing and education of children is its most important function.... Parents speak
and act for children, discipline them and determine what their education will be.
RuBiN, supra note 84, at 16.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol50/iss1/7
CHANGING THE BALANCE
the parent or the state.93 This bipolar analysis is inadequate to address
the child's conflicting interests in maintaining the connection with family
and receiving adequate care when the state is seeking to sever the parent-
child relationship.94
By the mid-twentieth century, the Court had established family
rights95 as a matter of substantive due process. 96 Parents have a
fundamental interest97 in making decisions regarding the education of
their children,98 and only a compelling interest can justify state
intrusion." Furthermore, parents are better equipped than the state to
provide children with the necessary care."* In 1972, the Court
93. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). The majority asserted:
Our holding in no way determines the proper resolution of possible competing
interests of parents, children, and State [in a case in which Amish children wish to
attend school against their parents' wishes].... [I]ntrusion by a State into family
decisions in the area of religious training would give rise to grave questions of
religious freedom ....
Id. at 231. See infra notes 126-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
competing interests analysis in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816
(1977).
94. RUBIN, supra note 84, at 180-82 (discussing the risks in due process analysis
if courts assign erroneous weight to the effected interests).
95. For discussion of whether the Court's due process analysis creates protected
"parent's" rights or "family" rights, see McCarthy, supra note 85, at 992-1006.
96. RUBIN, supra note 84, at 120.
97. This fundamental interest derives from "[tihe history and culture of Western
civilization [which] reflect[s] a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and
upbringing of their children." Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232.
98. "[Liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right
of the individual to... establish a home and bring up children,.. . and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness .. " Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). "The child is not the
mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right...
to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations." Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
99. "[W]here nothing more than the general interest of the parent in the nurture
and education of his children is involved, it is beyond dispute that the State acts
'reasonably' ... in requiring education to age 16 .... ." Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233
(emphasis added). The state also has unquestioned authority to regulate vaccination and
child labor, and to protect children from abuse and neglect. McCarthy, supra note 85, at
977-78.
100. "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations
the state can neither supply nor hinder." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
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reaffirmed these principles in Wisconsin v. Yoder.l01 Chief Justice
Burger's opinion relied on both a First Amendment free-exercise-of-
religion analysis and "the traditional rights of parents to supervise the
education ... of their children."' 02 The opinion expressly declined to
address the potential conflict between a parent's control of a child's
religious upbringing and a child's desire for education. 10 3
The Supreme Court moved within the family circle itself in several
cases that required an examination of the roles played by parents,
children, and the state. The following discussion examines the rights of
unwed fathers, foster parents, and biological parents in termination
proceedings.
1. The Rights of Unwed Fathers
In 1972, the Court addressed the rights of a biological parent against
the state's presumption of unfitness in Stanley v. Illinois.104  Stanley
was an unwed father who had lived with the mother of his children and
participated in their care.' 5 Upon the death of the children's mother,
Illinois found Stanley's children to be dependent'0 6 and took
custody.'0 7 The Supreme Court rejected the state's presumption of
unfitness, finding that parents have a protected interest in the 'custody,
care and nurture"' of their children.' 8 Removing children from the
care of unwed fathers without a prior fitness hearing violates both the
(1944) (holding that Massachusetts statute fining a parent for allowing child to sell
magazines was not invalid when applied to the sale of religious texts).
101. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Yoder affirmed the Wisconsin Supreme Court's
decision to overturn the conviction of Amish parents for violating the compulsory
education laws. Id. at 234-36.
102. RUBIN, supra note 84, at 130.
103. See supra note 93.
104. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
105. Id. at 646.
106. Under Illinois law, children without a "parent" are considered dependent.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 702-05 (1971). "Parents" were defined as "the father and
mother of a legitimate child, or the survivor of them, or the natural mother of an
illegitimate child and includes any adoptive parent, but the term does not include unwed
fathers." Stanley, 405 U.S. at 650 (citation omitted). Under this statute, Stanley's children
were "parentless" and thus, dependent. Id. See also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 701-14.
107. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646.
108. Id. at 651 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
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Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment"
Stanley used stirring language in granting protection to the
"essential" rights of unwed fathers ° against a "de minimis" state
interest."' This extended protection created, however, procedural
requirements for states seeking custody or adoption of the children of
absent or putative unwed fathers."12 The Stanley opinion did not
address questions regarding the potential conflict between protected
interests of fathers and the best interests of the child."
13
In 1978, the Court addressed the issue of the absent unwed father
in Quilloin v. Walcott."4 In Quilloin, a step-father's attempt to adopt
his wife's son was blocked by the boy's natural father who had never
legitimated him.' The natural father claimed that the Georgia statute
that allowed adoption without the consent of the unwed father violated
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses." 6 The trial court, after
extensive testimony from both parties, and without finding Quilloin
unfit, 117 applied the "best interests of the child" standard, and denied
him visitation." 8 In addition, the trial court found that, because
109. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658. According to Rubin, supra note 84, the Court
resorted to an analysis which blended due process and equal protection elements, rather
than relying solely on equal protection, because Justices Rehnquist and Powell, though
appointed, were not yet sitting on the bench. Rubin states that the Court wished to avoid
a possible expansion of equal protection doctrine without consideration by the full Court.
Id
110. "[T]he interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and
management of his or her children 'come[s] to this Court with a momentum for respect
.... '" Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 (alteration in original) (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
111. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 657. The state's asserted interest was to protect the best
interests of the child. Illinois argued that government supervision was "necessary" to
protect this interest because illegitimate children are usually raised by one parent. Id. at
653-54 n.5. The Court found that the state had a de minimis interest in protecting the
children of a fit parent. Id. at 657-58.
112. RUBIN, supra note 84, at 40.
113. Id.
114. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
115. Id. at 247.
116. Id. at 252.
Id.
118. Id. at 251. The mother testified that the natural father's infrequent visits
were having a "disruptive effect" on the child. Id.
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Quilloin never attempted to legitimate the child before the mother
consented to adoption by the step-father, he had no standing to
object." 9
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether "the best interests of the child" standard adequately protected the
unwed father's interests.120  Justice Marshall wrote that Due Process
required something more than the "best interests of the child" if the state
sought to break up an existing family.'2 ' However, this case did not
involve such a breakup; rather it sought to give "full recognition" to an
existing family.' Thus, termination did not implicate the unwed
father's due process rights."2 Nor did the father have a valid equal
protection claim. 24 Despite the different treatment under state law of
an illegitimate father and a divorced father, the former's interests were
"readily distinguishable" when he had assumed no significant responsi-
bility for the child. 12
5
2. The Rights of Foster Families
In Smith v. Organization of Foster Families,26 the Court
confronted a case in which foster parents claimed to have a protected
"liberty interest" in the "psychological family" created when they cared
for a foster child for a year or more. 27 The foster parents claimed that
New York statutes permitting the removal of foster children without a
prior hearing deprived them of this interest without due process. 28
The Court applied a balancing test 29 and found that the New York
119. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 251-52.
120. Id. at 254. Quilloin argued that, absent a finding of unfitness, the adoption
of the child over his objection was constitutionally invalid. Id. at 252.
121. Id. at 255.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 254-55.
124. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255-56.
125. Id. at 256. Cf. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 393 (1979) (holding that
a New York statute permitting adoption by the step-father with only the mother's consent
was invalid as applied to a natural father who had contributed to the child's care).
126. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
127. Id. at 839.
128. Id.
129. The Court applied the Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976),
analysis to determine whether the existing procedures adequately protected the interests
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procedures adequately safeguarded the foster families' interests. 3 '
The Court first examined the interests of the parties involved. The
denied that foster children had a liberty interest based merely on the
potential loss of a psychological family.'' The Court next addressed
the foster parents' claim to have a right to familial integrity.'32 In so
doing, the Court stated that biological ties, though historically important
to the Court, are not the exclusive determinants of family relations. 3
The emotional attachment that derives from daily care and association is
also significant.'34 Thus, foster families are not "a mere collection of
unrelated individuals."' 35 However, the foster family relationship arises
from a contractual arrangement with the state; thus, state law must
determine the "expectations and entitlements of the parties.' 36  As a
result, the Court was willing to assume that foster parents have no more
than a limited liberty interest. 137 In addition, the Court was unwilling
to say that foster parents have rights at the expense of the rights of
natural parents.138
The Court found that New York's procedures were adequate to
involved. The test requires the Court to balance three elements: (1) the existence of a
protected private interest affected by a state action; (2) a risk that an erroneous deprivation
of the interest will result from existing procedures, and the likelihood that additional
safeguards will reduce the risk; and (3) the state's interest, including the cost of additional
or substitute procedures. Smith, 431 U.S. at 848-49.
130. Id. at 848-56.
131. The trial court held that New York's procedures were constitutionally invalid
because they denied the foster child the right to be heard before suffering a "grievous
loss." Id. at 840. The Court, applying Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972),
said that the nature, not the weight, of the interest controls whether it is protected by the
Due Process Clause. Id. at 840-41.
132. Smith, 431 U.S. at 842-47.
133. Id. at 843.
134. Id. at 844.
135. Id. at 844-45.
136. Id. at 845-46.
137. Id. at 846.
138. Smith, 431 U.S. at 846. The Court stated:
It is one thing to say that individuals may acquire a liberty interest against arbitrary
governmental interference in the family-like associations into which they have freely
entered.... It is quite another to say that one may acquire such an interest in the
face of another's constitutionally recognized liberty interest that derives from blood
relationship, state-law sanction, and basic human right....
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protect all parties' interests. First, the Court rejected the trial court's
view that the child's interests require an automatic pre-removal
hearing. 39  The Court reasoned that, because the allegedly protected
interest was the right of family privacy based on close emotional ties, the
foster parent's ability to request a hearing would adequately protect the
foster child's interests. 40 The Court was similarly unimpressed with
the trial court's concern that the natural parents and child were not
parties to the hearing.'
4
'
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart rejected any claim of a
protected interest for foster parents. 42 He disagreed with the majority
that the child's interests in the relationship were the same as the foster
parents'."' However, in his view, the dictates of state law requiring
placement determinations based on the child's best interests adequately
protected the child's interest.'" Finally, Stewart rejected any argument
that the formation of emotional attachments in foster care created an
interest in family privacy.145  Such formation, he averred, was an
indication that the foster arrangement had failed of its essential
purpose-to prepare children for their return home or placement with
adoptive families.
146
139. Id. at 850. The trial court found that procedural safeguards available to
foster parents (e.g., the state must give a ten-day notice before removal; foster parents
could request a hearing) were insufficient to protect the child's interests, because the
child's interests are not co-extensive with those of the foster parent. Id.
140. The Court reasoned that if the foster family was not sufficiently motivated
by the emotional attachments to request a pre-removal hearing, as entitled, the foster
child's interests would not be served by providing a hearing to determine the harm that
would ensue by rupturing those ties. Id.
141. The Court stated that because the interest sought to be protected was that of
the foster family, the natural parents could have little input. Id. at 851-52. However,
nothing prevents the foster family from requesting the natural parents' participation.
Children also may be consulted. Id. at 852.
142. Id. at 857-58 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart stated that foster
families had "no basis for a justifiable expectation ... that their relationship [would]
continue indefinitely." Id. at 860.
143. Smith, 431 U.S. at 857-58 n.1 (Stewart, J., concurring).
144. Id. at 860.
145. Id. at 861-63.
146. Id. Justice Stewart fiirther stated: "If the foster family relationship were to
occupy the same constitutional plane as that of the natural family, the conflict between the
constitutional rights of natural and foster parents would be totally irreconcilable." Id. at
862 n.3.
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3. The Rights of Parents in Termination Proceedings
In 1982, the Court decided Santosky v. Kramer,147 which
addressed a due process challenge to New York's involuntary termination
procedures. 48  Specifically, parents challenged the state's use of the
preponderance of the evidence standard in determining whether the
parents had permanently neglected their children and terminating their
parental rights. 149  The Supreme Court held that a state must provide
parents with "fundamentally fair procedures"' 50 when it seeks to
terminate their parental rights, and it must meet, at minimum, the "clear
and convincing evidence" standard of proof.'5 '
The Court first reaffirmed the natural parents' interests. 52 As in
Smith, 3' the Court applied the Mathews v. Eldridge'54 balancing
147. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
148. New York employed a bifurcated hearing. Id. at 748. In the initial fact-
finding proceeding, the court determined whether a child was "permanently neglected" on
the basis of the parent's failure "substantially and continuously or repeatedly to maintain
contact with or plan for the future of the child . I..." d  (quoting N.Y. FAM. CT'. ACT
§ 614.1(d) (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1981-82)). In the second, dispositional, proceeding,
the court determined whether termination of parental rights was in the child's best
interests. Id.
149. Id. at 751-52. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, dismissed
the parents' constitutional challenge, stating that the preponderance of the evidence
standard reflected the legislature's attempt to balance the rights of the child and the
parents. Id. at 752.
150. Id. at 753-54.
151. Id. at 769. Cf. In re Diana P., 424 A.2d 178, 182 (N.H. 1980) ("[T]he
government must prove its case ... beyond a reasonable doubt before the permanent
termination of liberty and natural rights of parents guaranteed under the New Hampshire
Constitution... can occur.") (quoting and reaffirming State v. Robert H., 393 A.2d 1387,
1389 (1978)). cert. denied, 452 U.S. 964 (1981).
152. The Fourteenth Amendment protects "[the fundamental liberty interest of
natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child .... " Santosky, 455
U.S. at 753. This interest does not "evaporate" when parents have lost temporary custody
to the state; indeed, the parents have a greater need for procedural protections at the
termination stage. Id. "When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must
provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures." Id. at 753-54.
153. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977). See supra
notes 126-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of Smith.
154. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See supra note 129 for a description of the
balancing test.
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test.'55 In examining the private interests implicated by a termination
proceeding, the Court determined that natural parents have a "command-
ing" interest in the standard of proof' 56 The interests of the child and
the foster family, by contrast, are not implicated at the fact-finding
portion of the proceeding.'57 Rather, the state has moved directly
against the parent, "marshal[ling] an array of public resources to prove"
the parent's unfitness.'58 The child's interest is subsumed into that of
the parent until a court makes a finding of parental unfitness.'59 The
foster parent's interest, though it may be "substantial,"' 60 is not impli-
cated in state-initiated permanent neglect proceedings.' 6 ' The state's
interest in the welfare of the child is concomitant with the parent's
interest in accurate decision making. 62
The Court next found that the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
private interests was high under the preponderance of the evidence
standard. 63  This result was due to the greater resources the state
commands,"6 the likelihood that natural parents are "poor, uneducated,
155. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758.
156. Id. at 759. The Court based its conclusion on the nature and permanence
of the loss the parent suffers. A high standard of proof is necessary to protect the parent's
interest in the accuracy of the judicial determination. Id. at 758-61.
157. Id. at 759.
158. Id. at 760. The Court took a similar approach in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 230-31 (1972) (rejecting consideration of the child's interest in the context of
criminal prosecution of a parent for violation of the compulsory education law).
159. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760 ("[U]ntil the State proves parental unfitness, the
child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their
natural relationship."). For a criticism of this analysis of the involved interests, see RUBIN,
supra note 84, at 180 (stating that formal due process analysis obscures the real interests
of those involved).
160. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 761. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's
consideration of the interests of foster parents, see supra notes 131-38 and accompanying
text.
161. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 761. The Court distinguished between state-initiated
proceedings against natural parents, and those brought directly by foster parents. Id. In
addition, the foster parents have the opportunity to advocate for their interests during the
dispositional phase of the hearing. Id. Finally, natural parents' interests outweigh those
of foster parents due to the permanence of the findings. Id.
162. Id. at 766-67. The state's first parens patriae interest is in preserving
positive parent-child relationships. Id.
163. Id. at 764.
164. Id. at 763. The state is not limited in the amount of money it may spend
and the number of experts it may call in making its case. Id. In addition, because the
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or members of minority groups,"' 65 and the discretion the court has to
"underweigh probative facts that might favor the parent.' ' 16   In
completing the balancing analysis, the Court concluded that the state's
interest in the child's welfare is served by a stricter standard of
proof,'67 while the increased administrative burdens are minimal. 6
In summary, the Supreme Court has found that parents have a
fundamental liberty interest in the care of their children, 169 and that this
interest is not attenuated by the temporary loss of custody. 7
Children's interests in accurate decision-making regarding termination of
family ties are co-extensive with those of their natural parents.' 7'
Foster parents may have a liberty interest in the psychological family
created when they provide care for a foster child, but the interests of the
natural parent outweigh that interest.172 Finally, while states determine
the statutory grounds for involuntary termination, procedural due process
requires that the state prove those grounds by clear and convincing
evidence.'73 Although the Court has stopped short of requiring the
state to prove parental unfitness as a precondition of termination, it has
state caseworkers both provide reunification services and testify against parents, the state
exerts influence over the "historical events that form the basis for termination." Id.
Specifically, caseworkers establish visitation schedules and set tasks for parents to prove
their fitness. Id. at 763 n.13.
165. Id. at 763. See also Garrison, supra note 35, at 1827 ("It is no accident that
virtually all of the children in foster care come from families that are impoverished..
166. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 762.
167. Id. at 767.
168. Id. at 767-68. As evidence that the burden is minimal, the Court pointed out
that the New York Family Court applies the clear and convincing evidence standard in
other proceedings. Id.
169. See supra notes 97-99, 108 and accompanying text.
170. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
171. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760-61.
172. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845-47 (1977). See
supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text for a comparison of the rights of natural and
foster parents.
173. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769-70. See supra text accompanying note 151. For
other due process limitations on termination statutes, see Alsager v. District Court of Polk
County, 406 F. Supp. 10, 21 (S.D. Iowa 1975) (finding Iowa termination of parental rights
statutes to be unconstitutionally vague both as written and applied because they (1) fail to
give adequate notice; (2) permit arbitrary and discriminatory use of discretion; and (3)
"inhibit... the exercise of the fundamental right to family integrity"), opinion adopted
by 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976).
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given strong indications of such a requirement. 4
B. The Rhode Island Supreme Court
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has held that a court must find
parental unfitness before it may terminate parental rights. 75  This
requirement of parental unfitness is a component of Rhode Island's
overall analysis of the interrelation of the interests of the natural parent,
the child, and the state. 176  Part III.B explores Rhode Island's
derivation of the parental unfitness requirement, followed by a brief
review of the court's analysis of the interests involved.
1. Unfitness
In 1987, the Rhode Island Supreme Court decided In re Kristina
L.,'17 and held that a court must find parental unfitness before it may
174. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760. The Court stated:
Nor is it clear that the State constitutionally could terminate a parent's rights without
showing parental unfitness .... "We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause
would be offended if a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family
... without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was
thought to be in the children's best interest."
Id. at 760 n.10 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Cf In re K.A., 484 A.2d 992,
997-98 (D.C. 1984) (holding that a finding of unfitness is not required to terminate the
rights of a parent who has lost custody).
The Court has held that due process does not require the state to provide counsel to
every indigent parent facing termination procedures. Lassiter v. Department of Social
Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27-31 (1981). In making case-by-case determinations, trial courts
are to examine factors which increase the parent's risk of an erroneous deprivation of
rights, such as criminal abuse prosecution. Id. at 24-32.
175. In re Kristina L., 520 A.2d 574, 579-80 (R.I. 1987). "The best interest of
the child outweighs all other considerations once the parents have been adjudged unfit.
In essence, a finding of parental unfitness is the necessary first step." Id.
176. See In re Lester, 417 A.2d 877, 880 (R.I. 1980) (introducing a "three-
dimensional" analysis of the conflicting interests in the dependency-neglect context); In
re Jonathan, 415 A.2d 1036, 1039 (R.I. 1980) (stating that, although the child's best
interest is paramount, no single factor may be considered in isolation); In re LaPorte, 236
A.2d 264, 266 (RI. 1967) ("[T]he right of a natural parent to its child is lost only in
extreme circumstances."). See infra note 187 (contrasting Rhode Island's dependency-
neglect proceedings with termination proceedings).
177. 520 A.2d 574 (R.I. 1987). The facts of the case were as follows: The state
removed Kristina from her mother as an infant for "failure-to-thrive." She remained in
foster care for six years. Id. at 575, 578. The child and her natural parents participated
in an intensive reunification program which recommended the child's return home. Id, at
577. Despite the recommendation, the state petitioned to terminate parental rights after a
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terminate a parent's rights.17 The court reached this principle through
three avenues. First, the court quoted section 15-7-7 and, by implication,
found that the statute replicates the bifurcated proceeding that was at
issue in Santosky; that is, a court cannot consider the child's interests
until the dispositional stage, and only after a finding of parental
unfitness. 179  Second, the court quoted with approval dicta in
Quilloin80 and Smith""' which questioned the suitability of terminat-
ing a parent's rights without a finding of parental unfitness.1 2 Third,
the court applied the unfitness doctrine to its own precedent, finding that
unfitness was an implicit component of its prior decisions. 3
psychologist's evaluation found that the child had bonded with her foster family and was
unlikely to transfer that bond to her parents. Id. at 578. The trial court applied a "best
interest of the child" standard and terminated the parents' rights. Id. at 578-79.
178. Id. at 580. "In essence, a finding of parental unfitness is the first necessary
step." Id.
179. Id. at 579. The court stated:
At the initial stage of the hearing, the state should not presume that the natural parents
and the child are adversaries.... Once [§ 15-7-7's] requirements of proof are met, the
court may then assume, at the dispositional stage of the proceeding, that the interests
of the child may not coincide with those of the parents.
Id. (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982)). See supra note 148 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the New York statute at issue in Santosky.
180. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978). See supra notes 114-25 and
accompanying text (discussing Quilloin).
181. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977). See supra
notes 126-46 and accompanying text (discussing Smith).
182. Kristina L, 520 A.2d at 579-80. The court asserted:
[We have] little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended if a State were
to attempt the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and their
children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was
thought to be in the children's best interest.
Id. (internal quotes omitted) (quoting Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255). The Rhode Island court
mistakenly attributed the above statement as a holding.
183. Id. at 580. The court stated:
We acknowledge that we have not previously used the term "unfit" when describing
the finding required before parental rights may be terminated. Prior interpretations of
§ 15-7-7(c) have made it clear, however, that unless the child "is likely to suffer
physical and/or emotional harm, there is no reason to disturb the basic security of a
family relationship."
Id. (quoting In re Lester, 417 A.2d 877, 880 (R.I. 1980) and In re Jonathan, 415 A.2d
1036, 1039 (R.I. 1980)). The two cited cases did not address the termination of parental
rights proceedings, but the initial dependency-neglect proceedings at which the court
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Two difficulties emerge from the court's analysis in Kristina L.
First, the Santosky Court based its holding, which requires the state to
present clear and convincing evidence that it met the statutory grounds
for termination,184 on a procedural due process analysis.'85 The
Rhode Island Supreme Court, however, did not develop its analysis on
this or any other constitutional grounds; instead, it relied on precedent
and principles of statutory construction. 186  Thus, the principle estab-
lished by Kristina L. is vulnerable to attack via legislative action.
Second, despite the court's past efforts to distinguish the dependency-
neglect procedures from the termination procedure, 87 the Kristina L.
court transferred precedent based upon the former procedures 88 into
the latter procedures.'89
In summary, Kristina L. held that the state may not terminate a
parent's rights, regardless of the child's best interest, until the Family
assigned temporary custody to the state. In re Lester, 417 A.2d at 877; In re Jonathan,
415 A.2d at 1038.
184. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982).
185. See supra notes 147-68 and accompanying text (discussing Santosky).
186. See supra note 183 (quoting Kristina L.).
187. "[Unlike neglect or dependency proceedings,] [s]ection 15-7-7 does not
require a finding of harm as an essential prerequisite to the termination of parental rights."
In re Crystal, 476 A.2d 1030, 1034 & n.1 (R.I. 1984).
188. There are two stages of court intervention into family life. At an initial
proceeding, DCYF petitions the court for custody of a child based upon an allegation of
abuse, neglect, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-12 (Supp. 1994), or dependency. R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 14-1-34 (1994). This petition is referred to variously as the dependency, dependency-
neglect, or abuse-neglect petition. If there is an adjudication of abuse, neglect, or
dependency, the state awards DCYF temporary custody, while the parents retain their
residual rights. R.I. GEN. LAWs §§ 40-11-12, 14-1-34. See supra note 4 for a discussion
of residual rights. Twelve months after adjudication, the Family Court holds a
dispositional hearing, and may order DCYF to file a petition to terminate parental rights
if reunification is not indicated. RI. GEN. LAWS § 40-I 1-12.1(5)(c). DCYF may not file
a termination petition without a prior adjudication of abuse or neglect. Telephone
Interview with Kevin Aucoin, supra note 8. See infra note 189 for a discussion of the
differing implications of dependency and abuse-neglect petitions.
189. The court previously held that, prior to granting a dependency-neglect
petition, a court had to find that the child suffered, or was likely to suffer, physical or
emotional harm. In re Lester, 417 A.2d 877, 880 (R.I. 1980); In re Jonathan, 415 A.2d
1036, 1039 (R.I. 1980). By contrast, in a termination case, the court refised to require a
finding of harm to the child as a prerequisite to termination. In re Crystal, 476 A.2d 1030,
1034 (R.I. 1984). The paradoxical effect of these cases was to require the state to meet
a greater burden to take temporary custody than to permanently sever the parent-child
relationship.
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Court finds the parent is unfit. 9 ' The facts of Kristina L. clearly
justify this holding. 9' Although the analytic support for the court's
holding is less clear, it remains an unchallenged component of Rhode
Island's termination of parental rights law.'92
2. The Interrelated Interests
The court applies a "three-dimensional" framework'9 3 in its
consideration of the conflicting rights of the parent, the child, and the
state.'94 Although this approach recognizes the importance of parents'
interests, the primary focus is on the child's best interest.'95 The state
190. Kristina L., 520 A.2d at 579. A subsequent case established that unfitness
can be found in the absence of fault--as a result of chronic mental illness, for example.
In re
Rene B, 544 A.2d 137, 139 (R.I. 1988).
191. Kristina L. demonstrates one of the dangers inherent in foster care: a
temporary removal is extended through no fault of the parent, the young child bonds with
a nurturing foster family, and everyone balks at separating the "psychological family." See
supra note 177 for a discussion of facts in Kristina L. In an earlier case, the court
overturned a termination of parental rights, finding that the state social workers
discouraged visitation in order to promote the relationship between the two children and
their foster family. In re LaFreniere, 420 A.2d 82, 85 (R.I. 1980). Thus, the court's view
on the state's obligation to encourage the parent-child relationship was well-established at
the time of Kristina L.
192. Telephone Interview with Kevin Aucoin, supra note 8. DCYF does not view
the recent amendments to § 15-7-7 as reordering the priorities established by Kristina L.
Id.
193. See In re Lester, 417 A.2d 877, 880 (R.I. 1980) (rejecting a strict-scrutiny
standard as applying a "two-dimensional" approach, "fraught with grave danger to those
children whose welfare only the state may protect").
194. Id. In re Lester involved a dependency petition based on a lack of proper
parental care and supervision. Id. at 878. See supra note 187 for a discussion of
dependency petitions. The parent argued that the trial court should have applied a strict-
scrutiny standard. Id. The court rejected this approach as balancing only the interests of
the parent and the state. Id. at 879-80.
195. The court stated:
In following the three-dimensional approach, courts must be most careful in the
construction of an elaborate edifice of procedural safeguards based upon strict judicial
scrutiny that they do not create an impregnable constitutional bulwark behind which
private tyranny may proceed undeterred .... [Though parents' rights are] a most
essential consideration, . . . we ... recognize that the best interests and welfare of
the child outweigh all other considerations.
Id. at 880.
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has a parens patriae interest in protecting a child's welfare. 196 Foster
parents' rights derive from this state interest. 197
The court demonstrates its balancing of conflicting interests in its
consideration of the "reasonable efforts" requirement.198  Such efforts
are necessary to ensure that a developing bond between a child and a
foster family does not abrogate the child's ties to a fit natural parent.199
In giving meaning to section 15-7-7's reasonable efforts requirement, the
court adopted New York's statutory definition of "diligent efforts." 00
In its application of the reasonable efforst requirement, the court has
demonstrated a greater willingness to deny termination petitions when the
Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) fails to provide
readily available or easily quantified services.201 For example, the
196. Id. at 880-81.
197. See In re Kristina L., 520 A.2d 574, 582 (RI. 1987) (stating that, unless
unfit, imperfect natural parents have a right superior to that of exemplary foster parents).
See also In re Peter G., 577 A.2d 996, 998 (R.I. 1990) (holding that DCYF's decision to
allow child to move out of state with foster family without prior hearing violated natural
mother's due process rights).
198. Section 15-7-7(2)(a) (Supp. 1994). "[Ihe court shall find as a fact that...
[the] parental conduct or conditions must have occurred or existed notwithstanding the
reasonable efforts which shall be made by the agency prior to the filing of the petition to
encourage and strengthen the parental relationship; . . ." Id. (emphasis added). See also
42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1994) (requiring reasonable efforts, both before and during
placement, to strengthen the family relationship).
199. See Kristina L., 520 A.2d at 581. For a discussion of the merits of the
reasonable efforts requirement, compare Tamilia, supra note 52, at 212 (stating that the
reasonable efforts requirement offers parents a necessary protection) with Herring, supra
note 52, at 142-43 (discussing the delay in permanent placements for children caused by
the reasonable efforts requirement).
200. See In re Armand, 433 A.2d 957, 962 (R.I. 1981) (quoting N.Y. Soc. SERV.
LAW § 384-b.7.(f)(1)-(4) (McKinney 1992)). The New York statute defined "diligent
efforts" as including, but not limited to: (1) consulting with the parent in planning
reunification services; (2) providing suitable visitation arrangements; (3) providing services
to ameliorate conditions preventing reunification; and (4) informing parents of the child's
health, education, and progress. Id.
201. See Kristina L., 520 A.2d at 580 (finding the state's failure to provide
adequate visitation contributed to the "deep emotional ties" the child formed with the
foster family); In re Kenneth, 439 A.2d 1366, 1369 (R.I. 1982) (affirming the denial of
a termination petition because the state's reliance on a divorce decree to deny the non-
custodial mother visitation was not justified); In re LaFreniere, 420 A.2d 82, 85 (R.I.
1980) (holding that state workers' attempts to discourage visitation were irreconcilable
with the statutory duty to "encourage and strengthen" the parent-child relationship). But
see In re Armand, 433 A.2d at 959, 962 (finding that requiring the mother to confirm
visits two days in advance did not constitute a failure to make reasonable efforts).
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court has denied terminations upon DCYF's failure to provide for
adequate visitation.2 °2 Likewise, the court has required DCYF to assist
a parent with housing when homelessness is a primary barrier to
reunification. 23 By contrast, parents diagnosed with major psychiatric
disorders have had little success arguing a lack of reasonable efforts by
DCYF.20' Finally, the court has held as a matter of statutory construc-
tion that section 15-7-7 does not require DCYF to provide reunification
services to a parent whose rights it seeks to terminate due to conduct "of
a cruel and abusive nature.,
205
IV. RHODE ISLAND'S TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
STATUTE-PAST AND PRESENT
The termination of parental rights statute, section 15-7-7, is the
central device by which Rhode Island meets its obligation to provide
permanency planning' for children removed from the custody of their
parents due to abuse or neglect.07 The statute guides Family Court in
202. See Kristina L., 520 A.2d at 580.
203. In re Nicole G., 577 A.2d 248, 249, 251 (R.I. 1990) (ordering DCYF to
provide housing assistance to reunify family).
204. See In re Frederick, 546 A.2d 160, 163 (R.I. 1988) (finding that
"inappropriate pressure" by DCYF upon a mother to take medication for psychiatric
conditions did not diminish DCYF's reasonable efforts to strengthen the parent-child
relationship); In re Ann Marie, 461 A.2d 394, 395-96 (R.I. 1983) (finding that DCYF was
not required to provide services to a mentally retarded mother after she attacked her
husband with a cleaver in the presence of her child); In re Kathaleen, 460 A.2d 12, 14-15
(R.I. 1983) (finding that DCYF was not required to schedule appointment for mother
required by case plan to receive counseling). By contrast, California requires that, before
the state can terminate the rights of a developmentally disabled parent, the court must find
that the state has tried specifically designed services, and that despite the availability of
such services, it is in the child's best interests to terminate the parent's rights. See In re
Victoria M., 255 Cal. Rptr. 498, 499 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
205. In re Jean Marie W., 559 A.2d 625, 632-33 (RI. 1989) (applying the plain
meaning of § 15-7-7(2)(a) to excuse DCYF from the reasonable efforts requirement when
it is alleged that the parent is unfit by reason of cruel and abusive conduct). R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 15-7-7(1)(b)(ii), (2Xa) (Supp. 1994).
206. See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of
permanency planning.
207. If a parent is adjudicated on an abuse or neglect petition, DCYF obtains
custody of the child. R.I. GEN. LAws § 40-11-12 (Supp. 1994). In addition, DCYF can
obtain custody through a dependency petition in which DCYF alleges the parent cannot
care for the child through no fault of the parent. R.I. GEN. LAws § 14-1-34 (1994). This
legal fiction is often employed when parents voluntarily seek services for their child.
DCYF does not seek terminations for parents who recognize the need for additional
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making its dispositions by specifying the standard of proof."' Through
the reasonable efforts requirement, the statute also serves as the blueprint
for services which DCYF provides to children who are removed or are
at risk for removal, and their families.20 9 This Part reviews the history
of Rhode Island's termination of parental rights statute and examines the
1994 amendments.
A. History of the Statute
In 1896, the Rhode Island General Assembly enacted a law
addressing the rights of natural parents when a third-party sought
adoption of a child.210 This statute was one of a package of domestic
relations acts relating to marriage,2 ' divorce,12 married women's
rights,2t3 and the custody,21 4 and care,215 of children living apart
from their parents. The General Assembly modified this initial act in
subsequent amendments. Section 15-7-7 reflects its origin in adoption
solely by its current placement in the adoption chapter.2 6 The mid- to
late-twentieth century modifications reflect the growth of a child welfare
system, with an increasing focus upon child abuse and neglect. The
General Assembly has directed the most recent amendments, in part, to
support for a particularly troubled child. Telephone Interview with Kevin Aucoin, supra
note 8.
208. R.I. GEN. LAWs § 15-7-7(1) (Supp. 1994) (requiring the clear and
convincing evidence standard).
209. See infra part IV.A. for a discussion of the evolution of the statutory
requirement of reasonable efforts. For Rhode Island Supreme Court rulings on what
constitutes reasonable efforts, see supra notes 198-205 and accompanying text.
210. Adoption of Children, R.I. GEN. LAws tit. 20, ch. 192 (1896) (amended
1909) [hereinafter Adoption of Children, 1896].
211. Marriage, R.I. GEN. LAVS tit. 20, ch. 191 (1896) (amended 1909)
(addressing eligibility, licenses, and solemnization).
212. Divorce, R.I. GEN. LAws 633 tit. 20, ch. 195 (1896) (amended 1909) (addressing
divorce and separation).
213. Property-Rights of Married Women, R.I. GEN. LAWS tit. 20, ch. 194 (1896)
(amended 1909) (enacting the right to sell and devise property).
214. Wrongs to Children, R.I. GEN. LAWS tit. 14, ch. 115 (1896) (authorizing the
seizure of exploited children); Orphans and Needy Children, R.I. GEN. LAvs tit. 20, ch.
197 (1896) (granting power to take custody of children).
215. Maintenance of Bastard Children, R.I. GEN. LAWs tit. 11, ch. 81 (1896)
(amended 1915) (establishing obligations of the father).
216. See supra note 3.
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the problems of implementing permanency planning in an era of
increased maternal substance abuse.2 17
The 1896 enactment allowed any person to petition to adopt a
child.2"' Both parents, if living, had to consent to the adoption in
writing,2 9  unless they were "insane," under guardianship, or
imprisoned for three years or more.220 Similarly, the courts treated
parents who deserted their children or failed to provide them with
support for one year as though "such parent[s] were dead."' Upon
termination of the right to consent, a court could appoint a guardian to
consent to the future adoption.222
An amendment in 1955223 significantly expanded the role of
professional agencies 224 in the placement of children for adoption. 5
The statute created a right for natural parents to petition a licensed
agency for voluntary termination of the right to consent to a future
adoption.226 If the court found that the parents had freely joined the
agency's petition, and that granting the petition was in the child's best
interests, it vested the agency with the authority to consent to any
subsequent adoption. 227 The amendment did not change the statutory
grounds for involuntary termination of the right to consent.228 Howev-
er, the statute created the right for a licensed or governmental child-
217. Telephone Interview with Nancy Benoit, supra note 7.
218. Adoption of Children, 1896, supra note 210, § 1. Married persons must be
joined in the petition by a spouse.
219. Id. § 2. The consent of a child of fourteen years or older was also required.
220. Id. § 3.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Adoption of Children, ch. 3483, §§ 1-16, 1955 R.I. Acts & Resolves 174
(amended 1962) [hereinafter Adoption of Children, 1955].
224. The 1955 amendment defined professional agencies as persons, finns,
corporations or agencies licensed by the department of social welfare, or governmental
child-placing agencies. Id. § I.
225. Id. The amendment required anyone other than the natural parent to obtain
a license to "place, offer to place, or assist in the placement" of a child for adoption. Id.
226. Id. § 3.
227. Id. The licensed child-placement agency could not file the petition before
the child was three months old. Id.
228. Id. § 5. See supra text accompanying notes 220-21 for a discussion of the
statutory grounds for involuntary termination.
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placement agency to petition the court for involuntary termination of the
natural parents' rights.229 The statute also required that a hearing on
such a petition must occur no less than six months before the adoption
hearing.23°
The General Assembly passed section 15-7-7 in 1962.231 The
statute retained the existing grounds for involuntary termination,232 and
created an additional ground based upon mental incompetence resulting
in the "incapacity to provide care for a prolonged or indeterminate
period." 3 The court determined mental incompetence based upon the
testimony of two psychiatrists3 4  The statute did not define the
difference between insanity, for which termination did not require expert
testimony, and mental incompetence.235
The next modification to section 15-7-7 occurred in 1970.236 The
statute clarified that termination based upon the failure to support2 37
one's child required a finding that the parent had the financial capacity
to provide such support.238 The statute created a new ground for
termination if the court determined that a parent "permanently neglected"
a child 3 9 A court could find permanent neglect if the parent failed to
229. Adoption of Children, 1955, supra note 223, § 5.
230. Id.
231. Adoption of Children, ch. 106, § 1, 1962 R.I. Acts & Resolves 470, 472
(amending Rhode Island's general laws in chapter 15-7-7) (amended 1970). This Note
cites to the session laws for the 1962 and 1970 enactments.
232. "If either parent be insane, or under guardianship, or imprisoned... for a
term not less than three (3) years, or has wilfully deserted for one (1) year ... or has
neglected to provide proper care and maintenance for the child for one (1) year.... ." Id.
§ 1, at 472-73.
233. Id. § 1, at 473.
234. Id. § 1, at 473-74.
235. Id. It is possible that "insane" referred to confined persons, while
"incompetent" persons remained in the community. See supra note 232 for the specific
language.
236. Adoption of Children, ch. 132, § 1, 1970 R.I. Pub. Laws 532, 538 (amended
1980) [hereinafter Adoption of Children, 1970].
237. See supra text accompanying note 221.
238. Adoption of Children, 1970, supra note 236, § 1, at 538, 539. This change
reflected the holding of In re LaPorte, 236 A.2d 264 (R.I. 1967), which interpreted the
earlier version of the statute to prevent termination based on failure to support by parents
without financial ability. LaPorte, 236 A.2d at 267-68.
239. Adoption of Children, 1970, supra note 236, § 1, at 538, 539.
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"maintain contact with and plan for the future" of a child placed in the
state's care for a year or more.240  The parental failure must have
occurred notwithstanding reasonable efforts made by the state to reunify
and strengthen the family.
241
The General Assembly substantially restructured section 15-7-7 in
1980.242 The amended statute recognized several grounds for the
involuntary termination of parental rights to the child-parental
neglect, 243 parental unfitness due to "conduct or conditions" which are
"seriously detrimental to the child," 2' lack of remediation of the
conduct or conditions which led to the initial removal of the child,45
and desertion.2  In addition, the statute required the state to make
reasonable efforts to strengthen the parent-child relationship, thus
complying with the AACWA.247 Finally, the statute established that
240. Id. § I, at 540. The statute allowed the state to file an ex parte petition to
request a determination of permanent neglect before one year expired. Id. This definition
of the "permanently neglected child" closely parallels New York's definition. See N.Y.
Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b.7(a) (McKinney 1992).
241. Adoption of Children, 1970, supra note 236, at 540.
242. Adoption of Children, ch. 364, § 2, 1980 R.I. Pub. Laws 1436 (amended
1988) [hereinafter Adoption of Children, 1980]. In 1980 the legislature structured its
public laws as enumerated subsections; the remainder of this Note cites the enumerated
subsections of the public law.
243. Id. § 15-7-7(a). The parental neglect ground derived from the failure-to-
provide-support ground. See supra text accompanying note 221.
244. Adoption of Children, 1980, supra note 242, § 15-7-7(b)(l)-(3). The
conduct or conditions include parental emotional and mental illness, retardation, extended
institutionalization (including imprisonment), cruel or abusive conduct toward a child, and
substance abuse resulting in lack of proper care. Id. DCYF sought terminations most
often for parents whose mental illness impaired their capacity to provide adequate care.
Telephone Interview with Nancy Benoit, supra note 7.
245. Adoption of Children, 1980, supra note 242, § 15-7-7(c). This provision
replaced the 1970 amendment "permanent neglect" ground, and thus is different from the
"seriously detrimental" conduct and conditions. See supra notes 239-41 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of the "permanent neglect" ground. Section 15-7-7(c) eventually
evolved to address those children who remain in care for a statutorily defined period and
for whom the state deems reunification in the foreseeable future improbable. See infra
notes 292-96 and accompanying text for later versions of § 15-7-7(c).
246. Adoption of children, 1980, supra note 242, § 15-7-7(d). Lack of contact
for six months is prima facie evidence of desertion. Id.
247. Id. § 15-7-7 [unnumbered preamble]. The Assembly placed the reasonable
efforts requirement in the preamble to the 1980 amendment; thus DCYF had to
demonstrate that it had made such eflorts without regard for the grounds upon which the
termination was being sought. The Assembly restricted this overbroad requirement in
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all findings must meet the clear and convincing standard of
evidence,24 and that the court must give primary consideration to the
child's needs. 249  DCYF sought terminations most often for parents
whose mental illness impaired their capacity to provide adequate
care." The focus upon conduct or conditions may reflect the legisla-
ture's attempts to distinguish between those noninstitutionalized parents
who could, with support, adequately care for their children and those
who could not.
In 1988, the Rhode Island General Assembly restricted the
reasonable efforts requirement.' The amendment excluded from the
requirement terminations based on desertion,252 and cruel or abusive
conduct 5 3 In addition, the amended statute no longer required DCYF
to continue its reasonable efforts once it filed a termination petition,
though parents retained visitation rights pending the hearing.254
In summary, prior to the 1994 amendments, section 15-7-7 provided
for the involuntary termination of parental rights upon the following
grounds: failure to provide support despite financial ability to do so;2
placement of a child in the care of DCYF for at least six months with no
probable reintegration into the parent's home in the "foreseeable
1988.
248. Id. § 15-7-7(d). This is the evidentiary standard the United States Supreme
Court set in Santosky. See supra note 156 for discussion of the Court's rationale,
249. Adoption of Children, 1980, supra note 242, § 15-7-7(d) ("[The court shall
give primary consideration to the physical, psychological, mental and intellectual needs of
the child ...."). See infra notes 297-307 and accompanying text for the 1994
amendments to this requirement.
250. Telephone Interview with Nancy Benoit, supra note 7.
251. Termination of Parental Rights, ch. 289, § 15-7-7, 1988 R.I. Pub. Laws 584.
252. Id. § 15-7-7(d).
253. Id. § 15-7-7(b)(2).
254. Id. § 15-7-7(d). The 1988 amendments to the reasonable efforts require-
ments are a somewhat unsatisfactory compromise between competing interests. The
amendments protect children by not having them participate in reunification programs with
parents who have caused serious trauma; and, plainly the state cannot make reasonable
efforts with a parent it cannot locate. However, ceasing reunification efforts once the state
has filed a petition to terminate while permitting visitation perpetuates an uneasy status
quo, with all parties facing court-ordered cessation of the relationship. Visitation is an
incident of the parent's residual rights, however, and cannot be withheld until termination
of those rights. See supra note 4 for a discussion of residual rights.
255. Termination of Parental Rights, § 15-7-7(a).
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future;" 256 abandonment; 257 and parental unfitness as evidenced by
"conduct or conditions seriously detrimental to the child.' 28 Such
conduct or conditions included emotional or mental illness, mental
deficiency, and imprisonment; 2 9 cruel or abusive conduct toward a
child;' and substance abuse that interfered with the parent's ability to
provide care.26'  All grounds, with the exception of cruel or abusive
conduct, required the court to find that DCYF made reasonable efforts
to strengthen the parent-child relationship before petitioning to terminate
rights.262 The court must give the child's best interests primary
consideration.263
B. The 1994 Amendments
The Drafting Commission wrote the 1994 amendments to section
15-7-7 to redress several problems DCYF encountered in implementing
the permanency planning principles. 26 For example, children may wait
in state care for five years for "permanent" homes.2 61 As children
grow older, their chances of adoption diminish.26 In addition, DCYF
256. Id. § 15-7-7(c).
257. Id. § 15-7-7(d).
258. Id. § 15-7-7(b).
259. Id. § 15-7-7(b)(1).
260. Id. § 15-7-7(b)(2).
261. Id. § 15-7-7(b)(3).
262. Id. § 15-7-7(b)(3). Once DCYF filed a termination petition, the reasonable
efforts requirement was suspended. Id. § 15-7-7(d).
263. The statute directs the court to "give primary consideration to the physical,
psychological, mental and intellectual needs of the child insofar as that consideration is not
inconsistent with other provisions .. " Id. § 15-7-7(d).
264. The child welfare system's responsibilities to vulnerable children can be
divided into two categories: detecting and investigating abuse and neglect, and caring for
the children it has determined to be abused or neglected. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-1
(1988) (defining the state's policy toward abused and neglected children). The public will
direct their dissatisfaction with a child welfare agency against perceived inadequacies in
each category. However, the state's failure to promote the well-being of children it has
removed from families for their own protection meets with greater outrage than the failure
to protect a child the state had no reason to know was at risk. See, e.g., David Van
Biema, Abandoned to Her Fate: Neighbors, Teachers and the Authorities All Knew Elisa
Izquierdo Was Being Abused, TIME, Dec. 11, 1995, at 32.
265. Macris, supra note 7, at A17.
266. Id.
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was unable to prevent violent parents from inflicting harm on subsequent
children.267  Finally, DCYF workers were confused about what
constituted reasonable efforts.268 These issues concerning the imple-
mentation of the state's permanency-planning efforts co-existed with the
state's ongoing problems of scarce placement resources, large caseloads,
and an inefficient departmental structure.269
The General Assembly made four significant changes to section 15-
7-7: First, parents with chronic substance abuse problems face a higher
burden than under the prior law. Second, parents who lose custody
of a child due to abuse or neglect, and whose rights to another child
were previously terminated, may have their rights to the current child
terminated if the court finds that the parents "continue[] to lack the
ability or willingness to respond to [rehabilitive] services .... ""'
Third, parents whose child has been in the custody of DCYF for twelve
months and who have been offered services to correct the conditions that
led to placement may have their rights terminated if the court does not
find "a substantial probability that the child will be able to return to the
parents [sic] care within a reasonable period of time . . ,. . Fourth,
trial courts must examine the child's adjustment to foster care when it
267. Id. In 1984, a jury convicted a mother in the death of her four-year-old son.
Upon release from prison, she began a second family. Despite DCYF's involvement with
the family, the mother again abused one of her children. Id. This case demonstrates
another serious impediment to the delivery of child welfare services: a court did not hear
the abuse petition until 19 months after DCYF removed the children. The termination
hearing has yet to occur. Id.
268. Id. This confusion apparently resulted in the recent death of another child
who the state placed with his biological father at the conclusion of a paternity determina-
tion. Id. This occurred despite DCYF's earlier petition to terminate the father's rights on
abandonment grounds. Id. The DCYF workers believed that they had to make a
reunification effort with the boy's father. Id.
269. The General Assembly made modifications to DCYF's staffing requirements
and internal organization in earlier legislation. Telephone Interview with Nancy Benoit,
supra note 7.
270. R.I GEN. LAws § 15-7-7(l)(b)(iii) (Supp. 1994). "The child has been placed
in the legal custody or care of [DCYF] and the parent has a chronic substance abuse
problem and the parent's prognosis indicates that the child will not be able to return to the
custody of the parent within a reasonable period of time.... ." Id. See infra notes 278-79
and accompanying text for a discussion of the evidentiary requirements.
271. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(1)(b)(iv).
272. § 15-7-7(l)(c).
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considers the child's needs.273 This Part considers each change in turn.
1. Substance Abuse
Maternal substance abuse has replaced parental mental illness as the
primary reason the state seeks termination of parental rights.274  The
1994 amendment reflects the state's concern with the high rate of failure
among substance-abusing parents attempting to comply with treatment
programs.275  The prior statute stated merely that the state could
establish parental unfitness by "[e]xcessive [substance] use ... to the
extent that the parent loses his ability or is unwilling to properly care for
the child. 276 DCYF was required to make reasonable efforts to streng-
then the parent-child relationship.277 Under the amended version, a
parent whose child has been in the state's custody for twelve months278
has to overcome the prima facie case of chronic substance abuse.279
273. § 15-7-7(3). "IT]he court shall give primary consideration to the physical,
psychological, mental, and intellectual needs of the child insofar as that consideration is
not inconsistent with other provisions of this chapter." Id.
274. Telephone Interview with Nancy Benoit, supra note 7. The state removes
many infants at birth due to the presence of drug metabolites in their blood. See, e.g., In
re Jean Marie W., 559 A.2d 625, 632 (R.I. 1989). It also removes older children, not as
a consequence of a parent's drug use, per se, but because the drug use results in improper
care. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(l)(b)(iii) (1988). Thus, the children may have extended
exposure to marginal conditions before the time DCYF intervenes.
275. See Macris, supra note 7, at A17.
276. Termination of Parental Rights, ch. 289, § 15-7-7(b)(iii), 1988 R.I. Pub.
Laws 584.
277. Id. § 15-7-7(d).
278. The 12-month limit brings § 15-7-7 into conformity with the shortened limit
for holding a dispositional hearing under R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-12.1 (Supp. 1994). See
supra note 7 for a discussion of changes made to the statutes related to the termination of
parental rights.
279. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(l)(b)(iii) (Supp. 1994). "The fact that a parent has
been unable to provide care for a child for a period of twelve (12) months due to
substance abuse shall constitute prima facie evidence of a chronic substance abuse
problem." Id. Cf. IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.116.1(k)(2)-(3) (West 1994) (requiring, in
addition to a chronic substance abuse problem preventing the child's timely return, a
finding that the parent is a "danger to self or others as evidenced by prior acts"); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 260.221.1(b)(5)(i)-(v) (West Supp. 1995) (creating a presumption that
reasonable efforts have failed for parents who have been offered appropriate substance
abuse services, have failed to achieve success, and have continued to abuse chemicals);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-292(4) (1993) ("The parents are unfit by reason of debauchery,
habitual use of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs, ... which conduct is found.., to
be seriously detrimental to the.., juvenile .. "); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-147(e)(4)
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DCYF is still required to make reasonable efforts to strengthen the
parental relationship.80
The amendment effectively shortens the length of time within which
a substance-abusing parent must demonstrate her rehabilitation in order
to regain custody. Parents will have difficulty overcoming the prima
facie case for at least two reasons: first, successful treatment of chronic
substance abuse requires multiple interventions, and it is common for
patients to experience relapses; 28' second, most patients require an
initial period of inpatient treatment.22  Few facilities provide this
service to women receiving public assistance, and eligible patients face
long waiting lists. 28 3  The amended statute requires parents to
affirmatively prove their fitness despite such barriers to treatment. This
increased burden appears justified, however, based upon the high
treatment failure-rate.2s4 In addition, DCYF's initial intervention with
the family occurs only when the parent's substance abuse has become so
extreme as to result in substantiated allegations of abuse or neglect.
Thus, children have been exposed to a deteriorating environment for
unknown periods of time prior to being removed. One should note,
however, that the legislature has opted to respond to maternal substance
abuse by strengthening the termination statute, rather than by improving
the treatment options.28 5
(1991) (parental substance use is a factor to be considered in determining the likelihood
of child's return home in the near future).
280. R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-7-7(2)(a) (Supp. 1994).
281. Telephone Interview with Adrienne McGowan, LICSW, Substance abuse
private practitioner and consultant (Feb. 22, 1995).
282. Lenette Azzi-Lessing & Lenore J. Olsen, Substance Abuse-Affected
Families in the Child Welfare System: New Challenges, New Alliances, 41 SOCIAL WORK
15, 16 (1996).
283. Telephone interview with Adrienne McGowan, supra note 281.
284. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
285. One interesting option is to create treatment facilities in which mothers can
reside with their children. This arrangement maintains the parent-child relationship and
may serve to sustain the mother's recovery. This approach also presents treatment
providers with the opportunity to model necessary child-care skills. Rhode Island has two
such facilities. Telephone Interview with Adrienne McGowan, supra note 281. See also
Azzi-Lessing & Olsen, supra note 282, at 16 ("[A] family-centered approach would assist
[substance-abusing] women in carrying out their roles as parents and focus on the needs
of their children.").
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2. Prior Termination of Parental Rights
This addition represents an innovation in the Rhode Island
statute.2" 6 Under prior enactments, courts could not find the parents'
conduct toward other children to be a sufficient basis to terminate
parental rights to a child currently before the court.287  Parents
presumably faced the termination of rights to all then-living children if
their abusive conduct toward one child resulted in lengthy
imprisonment."' However, the "cruel or abusive" conduct provision
did not extend to children born subsequent to a parent's
imprisonment.289 Nor did this provision address a situation in which
286. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(l)(b)(iv) (Supp. 1994). "[T]he court has
previously terminated parental rights to another child who is a member of the same family
and the parent continues to lack the ability or willingness to respond to services which
would rehabilitate the parent...." Id. The statute does not require that DCYF make
reasonable efforts to strengthen the relationship prior to filing the petition. See id. § 15-7-
7(2)(a) (listing those grounds for which DCYF must demonstrate it made reasonable
efforts). Section 15-7-7(1)(b)(iv) permits DCYF to file a petition immediately upon taking
custody
of a child whose parent has demonstrated prior unfitness.
Many states have a more relaxed standard based upon prior abuse or neglect of another
child, seemingly without requiring a prior termination of rights. See, e.g., COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 19-3-604(1)(b)(IV) (West Supp. 1994) ("Gravely disabling injury or death
of a sibling due to proven parental abuse or neglect" is evidence that "no appropriate
treatment plan can be devised to address [parental] unfitness .... ); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
13, § 1103(a) (5)a.l (1993) (listing "a history of neglect, abuse or lack of care of this child
or other children by this parent" as a factor in termination based upon parent's inability
to plan for the child's needs); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.464(l)(c)-(d) (West Supp. 1996)
(conduct toward the child or other children which demonstrates a threat to "the life or
well-being of the child irrespective of the provision of services" is a circumstance
justifying petition). Iowa permits termination based upon a prior adjudication of physical
or sexual abuse against another child in the family, IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.116.1.c(l)
(West 1994), or prior termination. Id. § 232.116.1.f(2). In Maine, a parent's conviction
for a violent crime against a child creates a rebuttable presumption of unfitness. ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4055.l-A(B)(l)-(12) (West Supp. 1995).
287. See supra notes 223-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of prior
enactments. But see note 289 infra for a discussion of R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(l)(b)(ii)
(Supp. 1994).
288. See Termination of Parental Rights, ch. 289, § 15-7-7(b)(1), 1988 R.I. Pub.
Laws 584. "The parent is unfit by reason of... imprisonment of such [a] duration as to
render it improbable for the parent to care for the child for an extended period of time."
Id.
289. Id. § 15-7-7(b)(2) (a finding of parental unfitness may be based upon cruel
or abusive conduct toward "any child"). On its face, section 15-7-7(b)(2) appeared to
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DCYF obtained custody of several children, but was able to substantiate
the grounds for termination for only one child. Under the amended
version, DCYF may file for the termination of parental rights to all
children upon an adjudication of abuse or neglect to any one of
them.290 As a result of the reduced standard,29 ' this amendment
allows DCYF to move quickly in addressing the siblings of a child to
whom the court has previously terminated parental rights.
3. Twelve Months in DCYF's Custody or Care292
The General Assembly has made two significant amendments to this
provision: First, the length of time a child must remain in DCYF's care
before filing a petition to terminate parental rights has increased from six
months to twelve.293 Second, the amendment eliminates the require-
ment that DCYF make reasonable efforts and replaces it with a
requirement to offer services.294 The drafters seem to have directed
permit DCYF to seek termination of parental rights to all children if a parent was
adjudicated of such conduct toward any child in the family. Id. There are two potential
weaknesses for using the cruel or abusive conduct provision as a ground for terminating
rights to other children. First, it does not apply to those children whose parents have been
neglectful of other children. Id. § 15-7-7(a). Second, it is ambiguous as to whether the
child for whom DCYF seeks termination must be in its custody. The effect of the new
provision may be to narrow the application of the cruel or abusive conduct ground to the
abused child alone.
290. R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-7-7(l)(b)(iv) (Supp. 1994). DCYF still must have
custody of each child for whom it seeks a termination of parental rights. Id. This requires
a prior finding of abuse or neglect. Telephone Interview with Kevin Aucoin, supra note
8.
291. In place of the reasonable efforts requirement, the court must find that the
parent is unwilling or unable to respond to services, and that further services are unlikely
to result in reunification in a timely manner. § 15-7-7(1)(b)(iv) (Supp. 1994).
292. The prior version applied to a child "in the care of a licensed or
governmental child placement agency, either voluntarily or involuntarily, for a period of
at least six (6) consecutive months ...." Termination of Parental Rights § 15-7-7(c).
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has interpreted "care" in this provision to mean "care
and custody." In re Antonio G., 657 A.2d 1052, 1059 (R.I. 1995). The amended version
requires the child to be "placed in the legal custody or care" of DCYF. R.I. GEN. LAWs
§ 15-7-7(l)(c) (Supp. 1994). This would appear to require an adjudication of abuse or
neglect.
293. Compare Termination of Parental Rights § 15-7-7(l)(c) (requiring that a
child be in DCYF's care for six consecutive months).
294. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(1)(c) (Supp. 1994). "[T]he parents were offered
or received services to correct the situation which led to the child being placed.. . ." Id.
Compare Termination of Parental Rights § 15-7-7(c) (requiring the "failure of the parent
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this provision toward those cases in which a combination of factors have
delayed the child's return home, while no single factor is sufficient to
result in termination.
The impact of this modification depends on the circumstances in
which DCYF relies upon this ground. If, for example, DCYF historically
relied upon this ground to terminate the rights of minimally compliant
substance abusers, the new substance abuse amendment would address
this class of cases.295 The amended ground could, however, permit
DCYF to terminate the rights of any parent whom DCYF perceives as
making slow progress toward full compliance with a case plan. For
example, DCYF could move to terminate the rights of a chronically
homeless parent, without providing any housing assistance.296
4. The Child's Adjustment to Foster Care
This amendment expands the prior directive to the court to consider
the child's "physical, psychological, mental, and intellectual needs. 297
The purpose of this amendment is not, as it appears on its face, to
promote the interest of the foster family over that of the natural parents.
Rather, the drafters thought that evidence of a child's attachment to a
to effect a lasting adjustment after reasonable efforts by available social agencies for such
an extended duration of time that it appears reasonable that no lasting adjustment can be
affected").
295. See supra notes 274-85 and accompanying text.
296. See In re Nicole G., 577 A.2d 248, 251 (R.I. 1990) (holding that Family
Court may order DCYF to provide housing assistance in keeping with the reasonable
efforts requirement).
297. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(3) (Supp. 1994). The amendment states:
Such consideration [of the child's best interest] shall include the following: If a
child has been placed in foster family care,. . . the court shall determine whether the
child has been integrated into the foster family to the extent that the child's familial
identity is with the foster family and whether the foster family is able and willing to
permanently integrate the child into the foster family. ... [T]he court should
consider- (1) the length of time child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment
and the desirability of maintaining that environment and continuity for the child; (2)
the reasonable preference of the child, if the court determines that the child has
sufficient capacity to express a reasonable preference.
Id. Compare IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.116.2.b (West 1994) (using substantially similar
language). Massachusetts does not separately consider parental conduct and other factors
contributing to the child's best interest: a child's attachment to a substitute caretaker is a
factor of equal weight to the parent's abuse or neglect of a child. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 210,
§ 3(cXi)-(xiii) (1994). Nevada specifies that the ultimate goal of parental termination is
adoption by the child's foster family. NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.108 (1991).
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foster family indicated the degree to which the child had attenuated her
attachment to the natural parents.298 Thus, terminating parental rights
would not run contrary to the child's best interests.299
This provision has substantial implications for the manner in which
DCYF administers case-management services to children, parents, and
foster families prior to considering the termination petition. The
amended version creates two potential problems: first, it may reduce the
safeguards against DCYF workers unconsciously acting on impermissible
bases;300 and second, it may increase the pressure on foster parents to
adopt a child who has been in their care.
DCYF social workers have primary responsibility for communi-
cating to all parties the intended nature of the foster relationship
-- temporary and in support of, not detrimental to, the child's return
home.30' The workers must balance the conflicting interests of the
parent, child, foster family, and state.302 Furthermore, they must
balance those interests in the context of an ongoing interaction, in
contrast to the single moment of time the court considers at a termination
proceeding. Workers must manage their natural desire to see a child
remain in an environment that can meet the child's needs more
adequately than the parent can. A worker who believes that indications
of the child's adjustment increases the likelihood of the child becoming
available for adoption by the foster family may unintentionally encourage
the development of a permanent relationship, at the expense of the bond
with the natural parent.
303
298. Telephone Interview with Nancy Benoit, supra note 7.
299. Id.
300. The Rhode Island Supreme Court has stated:
[E]ven though it may be in a child's best interest to live with a family of comfortable
means ... this standard may not justify the state's intervention into a family
relationship ....
... [W]orkers must take care not to impose their own values regarding proper
familial relationships on the families they meet in the course of their work.
In re Kristina L., 520 A.2d 574, 581 (R.I. 1987).
301. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 857-58 (1977)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
302. See supra notes 129-46 (discussing the Smith decision).
303. Case reports indicate that children may become tearful or disruptive shortly
before or after visits with a parent. These are normal reactions as a child adjusts to being,
in essence, a citizen of two households. A skillful worker can help a foster parent
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The second problem which may arise under this amendment affects
those children placed in long-term foster care. Once DCYF takes
custody of a child, it may turn to relatives, especially grandparents, to
provide care for the child.30" Often the relatives can manage the
additional expense only through the foster care board.3"5 When a child
is adopted, the state no longer provides that money. If the prior
relationship with a relative helps the child to adjust to living apart from
his parents, and evidence of that adjustment increases the likelihood of
termination, the state may expect the foster parents to adopt the
child.3" If the foster parents refuse, the state will move the child to
a pre-adoptive foster home307 to begin the process all over again.
The legislature has attempted to protect against this outcome through
changes to two related statutes. First, the new guardianship act permits
foster families to retain care of the child with financial support from
DCYF,3"' while relieving DCYF of the obligation to provide case-
management services.3°9 Both the parent and DCYF must consent to
the guardianship."' This disposition does not result in the termination
of the parent's rights.31' Second, the General Assembly amended the
statute governing dispositional hearings to prevent the termination of
parental rights for children under age ten placed with relatives who are
willing to provide a home on a long-term basis but are unwilling to
adopt. 12
DCYF may not want to pursue the guardianship alternative. The
child welfare system has understood permanency planning to require the
understand that such signs do not necessarily indicate that the child's visits with his parent
are bad for him. This understanding will help the foster parent to feel less conflicted about
the child's parent, and more supportive of maintaining that relationship. See supra note
177 (discussing the facts of Kristina L.) A child's behavior has evidentiary implications
as well: a worker who believes that this behavior is a manifestation of the parent's
inadequacy will present that information in court to the detriment of the parent.
304. Telephone Interview with Nancy Benoit, supra note 7.
305. Homer, supra note 20, at 196.
306. Telephone Interview with Kevin Aucoin, supra note 8.
307. Id.
308. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 40-11-12, -12.3 (Supp. 1994).
309. Telephone Interview with Nancy Benoit, supra note 7.
310. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-12.
311. Telephone Interview with Nancy Benoit, supra note 7.
312. RI. GEN. LAWS § 40-11 -12.1(5)(d)(iii).
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placement of a child either with the natural parent or an adoptive
family."3 The guardianship plan depends upon recognition of a third
alternative: it permits a child to maintain a legal relationship with the
natural parent while residing with another family which is able to meet
the child's needs on an ongoing basis.3" 4 This option may be
preferable to the "more secure" adoption which, in actuality, requires
severance of yet another familial relationship. DCYF has no incentive
to seek guardianship in appropriate cases, however, because it will
continue to bear the expense of board payments.3" 5 Thus, Family Court
judges, guardians, and foster families will bear the onus in pursuing this
option.
V. THE IMPACT OF AMENDED SECTION 15-7-7
ON CHILD WELFARE SERVICES
The permanency planning effort recognizes two routes to achieving
its goal of permanent relationships for children removed from their
parents: first, the state may restore the natural family unit by providing
services to strengthen the parent-child relationship;3"6 or second, the
state may move to legally terminate the parent-child relationship it
determines to be irretrievably broken, thereby providing the child with
the opportunity to form a legal tie to a subsequent permanent
caretaker.317 The state selects the applicable route to permanence after
determining the natural parent's ability to become a functioning
parent."" The reasonable efforts requirement ensures that the state
engages in actual fact-finding of parental ability.31 9 This requirement
also attempts to ensure that the court does not find a parent inadequate
based upon an impermissible bias against poor, illiterate, minority, or
other disfavored parents.320
313. See supra notes 29-59 (discussing permanency planning).
314. R.I. GEN. LAWs § 40-11-12.1(5)(d)(iii).
315. Id. § 40-11-12.3.
316. See supra notes 44 and 53 and accompanying text.
317. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
318. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7 (Supp. 1994).
319. See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
functions of the reasonable efforts requirement.
320. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of potential
bias against natural parents.
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DCYF has had fifteen years of experience with the implementation
of permanency planning principles.32' Rhode Island has struggled to
discern the difference between fit and unfit parents.322 As a result of
the uncertainty inherent in this process, terminations occur only after
several years of state involvement.323 This lengthy process yields what
is arguably the worst of both worlds: the state finally terminates the
parent-child relationship after years of unsatisfactory reunification
attempts, and the children are old enough to be considered
unadoptable. 324 In pursuit of reunification, the children have lost an
uncountable number of temporary homes and families. In effect, this
policy leave these children with no parent but the state.
The Rhode Island General Assembly enacted the 1994 amendments
to the termination of parental rights statute with the goal of increasing
the speed and number of terminations. 325  The amendments have
proven effective in this regard: DCYF has filed increasing numbers of
termination petitions since the enactment of the amendments.326 The
appropriateness of these terminations hinges upon the following three
factors: (1) the degree to which the courts require DCYF to make reason-
able efforts in order to ensure that it dissolves only those irretrievably
broken families;3 27 (2) the age of the children at the time of the
termination;328 and (3) the development of sufficient numbers of
appropriate adoptive homes and post-adoption services.
The amendments narrow the reasonable efforts requirements for
321. Congress enacted the AACWA in 1980. Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500
(1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The 1980 amendments
to R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7 brought the statute into compliance with the federal mandates.
See supra notes 242-50 and accompanying text for the version of § 15-7-7 in effect in
1980.
322. See supra part IH.B.l for a discussion of Rhode Island's requirement of
unfitness as a precursor to termination of parental rights.
323. Macris, supra note 7, at A17.
324. See id.
325. Telephone Interview with Kevin Aucoin, supra note 8.
326. Macris, supra note 7, at AI7.
327. See supra notes 198-205 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
reasonable efforts requirement.
328. See, e.g., Macris, supra note 7, at A17 (discussing the impact of age upon
a child's potential for adoption).
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parents falling into two categories:329 (1) those whose rights to another
child were terminated in the past330 and (2) those who have not
regained custody after their child has spent twelve months in DCYF's
care.33' The first category in effect permits the court to recognize the
reasonable efforts made by DCYF in its earlier interventions with a
family--efforts that failed to reunify the parent and child.332 The
amendment, however, requires the court to determine the utility of further
services in remedying the current parent-child relationship. 333  This
requirement may reduce the risk of an erroneous present termination.
By contrast, reducing the reasonable efforts requirement for parents
in the second category is far more problematic. In essence, the statute
permits a court to order a termination because a child "lingered" in care,
without examining the impact of DCYF action-or inaction-upon that
length of placement. Whether a parent complied with DCYF's
reasonable efforts is one source of information regarding their
fitness.334  Thus, if DCYF must only "offer '335 services, this will
deprive the court of information necessary to determine the parent's
fitness. Unless the court examines why the parent did not comply with
DCYF's reasonable efforts, there may be an increased risk of termina-
tions based upon impermissible factors, such as poverty.336 This would
result, for example, if DCYF required a parent to participate in a
reunification program in another town, but did not provide the parent
with transportation. 3'
329. The substance abuse amendment creates a shift in the burden, while retaining
the reasonable efforts requirement. R.I. GEN. LAWs § 15-7-7(1)(b)(iii) (Supp. 1994). See
supra part IV.B.1.
330. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(1)(b)(iv). See supra part IV.B.2.
33 1. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(1)(c). See supra part IV.B.3.
332. If previous terminations were based upon cruel or abusive conduct, then
DCYF is not required to make reasonable efforts. See R.I. GEN. LAWs § 15-7-7(2)(a)
(excluding this ground from the reasonable efforts requirement).
333. Id. § 15-7-7(l)(b)(iv).
334. See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
335. R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-7-7-(1)(C) ("[T]he parents were offered or received
services to correct the situation .... ).
336. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 762-63 (1982), (describing the
risks to poor or minority parents in termination proceedings).
337. Although the Office of the Public Defender represents parents at termination
hearings, parents are not represented at Family Court reviews or dispositional hearings.
Compare R.I. R. Juv. P. 17(d) (1994) (directing DCYF to report to Family Court regarding
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The impact of the recent increase in terminations will vary with the
age of the children. A child's chances of being adopted diminish as the
child grows older.33 This may result from a combination of factors:
adoptive parents often want to start with an infant; those who are willing
to consider older children may be concerned that an older child has been
exposed to damaging environments;339 older children who have been
in the child welfare system for extended periods may have learned to
distrust the promise of permanence. For those children just entering
DCYF's care, amendments which speed the process for younger children
will mitigate these risks.340  However, for those children who have
been awaiting the resolution of their cases for long periods, DCYF
should closely examine the likelihood of a successful adoption for each
child. 4 1  If it appears that the chief barrier to adoption is not the
child's legal tie to a parent, Family Court should consider permitting the
child to maintain that tie, while extending DCYF's custody to permit the
child to remain in substitute care.342 The court may ask older children
their wishes under these circumstances.343
In order for adoption to become a real alternative, Rhode Island
will have to expend resources to locate adequate adoptive families.
Furthermore, the state must recognize that the successful creation of a
service plan; no requirement for counsel for parents) with R.I. R. Juv. P. 18(c)(4)
(requiring appointment of counsel for termination hearing). The court reviews a parent's
progress toward fulfillment of the DCYF case plan at these hearings. See RI. R. Juv. P
17(d). If DCYF is not providing sufficient support to a parent, that fact may not come to
the attention of the court unless the parent addresses the deficiency. The records establis-
hed at reviews are relied upon at termination hearings.
338. Macris, supra note 7, at A17.
339. "[T]he older children get, and the more emotional baggage they accumulate,
the less attractive they are to prospective parents." Id.
340. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-I1-12.1(5)(d) (Supp. 1994) (requiring termination
petition be filed at 12 months for child aged 10 or younger). See supra text accompanying
note 312.
341. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(c)(1) (West Supp. 1996)
(requiring clear and convincing evidence that a child will be adopted as a prerequisite for
termination).
342. The guardianship provision applies only to those children placed with
relatives. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-12.1(5)(d)(iii) (Supp. 1994).
343. Section 15-7-7(3) directs the court to consider "the reasonable preference of
the child, if the court determines that the child has sufficient capacity" in determining the
degree to which a child has become integrated into a foster home. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-
7-7(3) (Supp. 1994).
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family is not sealed with a court decree. Post-adoption services will be
especially critical for those children who have been in DCYF's care for
extended periods. The AACWA does not provide funding for post-
adoption services, unless the state has designated the child as having
special needs.3" It would be short-sighted to hasten ill-considered
adoptions simply because the new statute permits that result. The
formation of a family by legal decree is an undertaking fraught with
difficulties under the best of circumstances. With proper planning and
support the adoptive family and child may negotiate these difficulties.
Failure to provide that support is likely to result in yet another failed
home for a child, and devastation to yet another family.
VI. CONCLUSION
The AACWA of 1980 had two principal goals: first, to ensure that
children establish permanent bonds with caretakers;345 and second, to
prevent unnecessary separations of parents and children.346 These goals
reflect the ordering of familial relationships seen in various United States
Supreme Court decisions:3 47 Fit parents have a compelling interest in
the care and custody of their children.348 The state has a parens
pati'ae interest in protecting children from abuse or neglect.3 49 The
child has an interest in growing up in an environment free of harm.350
Clearly these goals are intertwined, and, at times, conflict.35 ' In
addition to wrestling with these conflicting interests, Rhode Island has
struggled to implement each of the AACWA's goals because of
inadequate resources.352
Rhode Island's recent amendments to its child welfare statutes in
general, and the termination of parental rights statute in particular, reflect
344. 42 U.S.C. § 673(c)(2) (1994).
345. Id. § 625(a)(1)(C)-(F).
346. Id. § 625(a)(1)(C).
347. See supra part IH.A for a discussion of the pertinent constitutional doctrine.
348. See supra text accompanying note 108.
349. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).
350. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
351. See supra part III.B.2 (discussing Rhode Island's analysis of these conflicting
interests).
352. See supra note 55-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of funding
inequities and the AACWA.
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the state's experience with permanency planning since the passage of the
AACWA sixteen years ago. The amendments attempt to refine the
circumstances under which the state may seek terminations, with the goal
of increasing the speed with which the state makes such determina-
tions."3  By shortening the period of time during which a court
examines a parent's fitness, the state moves closer to protecting the
child's interests. However, speed is only one element in meeting the
needs of children in the state's care. Rhode Island must find and support
alternative adoptive homes if the 1994 amendments to section 15-7-7 are
to yield a true benefit.
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353. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
* M.S.W. 1988, Rhode Island College; J.D. 1996, Washington University.
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol50/iss1/7
